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Murillo et al., 2008). The main findings indicate that i) the Chilean policymaking 
process (PMP) was successful in the 1990s in implementing productivity-
enhancing policies, but as the country moved to a higher stage of development, 
the PMP grew less adept at generating the more complex set of policies needed to 
increase productivity at this stage; and ii) the Chilean PMP is less transparent than 
previously thought (Aninat et al., 2008), thus allowing political actors to favor 
private interests without being punished by the electorate. This has become 
apparent as the more sophisticated reforms needed at this stage of development 
require a deeper and more consolidated democracy.  
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  11.  Introduction 
 
Chile has experienced outstanding economic growth since its transition to democracy. From 
1990 to 2005, its GDP expanded at an annual average of 5.5 percent. GDP per capita (PPP, 
current US$) increased from 4,800 to 12,250. The country entered the upper-middle-income 
bracket, significantly transforming its socioeconomic structure.  
This growth process has two distinct sub-periods. In 1990-97,
1 the country averaged a 
growth rate of over 7 percent. Afterwards, growth rates dropped to an annual average of slightly 
more than 4 percent. During the first sub-period, growth was driven by productivity gains. After 
1997, however, the country experienced very low total factor productivity (TFP) gains.  This 
paper seeks to identify and explain the political economy factors driving the decline in 
productivity growth rates. We analyze the political economy mechanisms responsible for the 
decline in productivity growth rates using a modular approach which combines different 
theoretical modules to study the distinct but interrelated dimensions of the policymaking process 
of productivity-enhancing policies.   
Rather than focusing on microeconomic TFP analysis, we analyze the types of policies 
and institutions needed to enhance productivity at three basic levels of development: factor-
driven, efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven economies. Policies that generate growth at the 
first stage are the basic requirements of institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and 
human capital investments in health and education. At the efficiency stage, policies should be 
oriented toward quality higher education and training, goods and labor market efficiency, 
financial market sophistication, and technological readiness. On the economic frontier, growth is 
generated by business sophistication and the capacity of firms to innovate. Sustaining high levels 
of growth becomes more difficult as countries reach higher levels of development.  During the 
period under study, Chile advanced from the basic needs stage to the need to increase efficiency 
and generate innovations in order to maintain high productivity growth rates. 
To analyze the factors driving the decision-making process for productivity-related 
policies, we use the political transaction-cost model put forward by Spiller and Tommasi (2003), 
Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003), and Murillo et al. (2008) that suggests that the quality of 
policies is determined by the characteristics of the policymaking processes (PMP), which in turn 
are determined by the characteristics of institutional arrangements and social actors intervening 
                                                           
1 Accelerated growth started in the mid-1980s. Here, we focus on democratic policymaking, hence starting in 1990.  
  2in the relevant policy area. We expand this model to include the relevance of the characteristics 
of the specific policy issue being addressed.  
The analysis of institutions and the policymaking game in Chile builds on the work by 
Aninat et al. (2003, 2008). We deepen the analysis on the workings of institutions, particularly 
regarding the legislative process and the internal party system, including candidate selection, 
financing, and the election of party leaders. The paper’s main insight on the political economy of 
productivity comes from detailed cases studies of six productivity-related policy episodes. 
Policymaking processes that are successful at generating growth at a low stage of 
development may not be as successful at higher stages, when policies are more complex. Some 
policies require the electorate to master more sophisticated information and grasp its 
implications. For example, for the electorate it might be easier to understand how to improve the 
coverage of education than to grasp the complex set of variables that account for improvements 
in the quality of education.  The Chilean PMP was successful at implementing first-generation 
and some second-generation reforms, but as the country developed it grew increasingly less 
adept at generating efficiency-enhancing policies necessary to maintain high productivity 
growth.  
Despite its low level of corruption and a transparent congress as the main policymaking 
arena, Chile’s PMP is, in our view, less transparent than previously thought. The opaque internal 
workings of political parties, together with the low competitiveness of the binominal electoral 
system, obscure the visibility of the moves of political actors. This allows politicians to favor 
private interests over the preferences of their constituencies without facing electoral 
consequences. This is compounded by the strongly ideological orientation of the Chilean 
electorate and policymakers.   
When Chile was implementing factor-driven policies characterized by high public 
visibility, the weight of potential information asymmetries was lower, allowing for good 
policymaking. The higher complexity of efficiency and innovation-enhancing policies has 
rendered policymaking less capable of generating good policy outcomes. We do not deny the 
previous success of the political system and policymaking process. In fact, the new order 
problems are only possible because Chile was successful. Yet, we caution about the PMP’s 
limitations for addressing current policy challenges and thus generating future productivity (and 
economic) growth. 
  3Finally, we found that the capacity for representation of policy interests by major 
socioeconomic actors is influenced by their level of aggregation in relevant policy areas and by 
the ideological intensity and fragmentation of the actors and their historical public standing. 
Examples of this are the right-wing think tank Libertad y Desarrollo (LyD) and the labor union 
Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT). LyD, a think tank financed by large 
corporations and wealthy individual donors, has an enormous influence on the policy process. 
Although widely associated with the most conservative right-wing party, the Independent 
Democratic Union (UDI), LyD does not have formal ties to the right-wing electorate or to the 
community of small and medium-sized business owners. But given its members’ role in the 
establishment of the market-based economic system during the military regime, it enjoys the 
support of the business-minded electorate, even when LyD defends the interests of large 
corporations and majority shareholders against the interests of SMEs and minority stock owners.  
Similarly, CUT has considerable political influence despite Chile’s low unionization rate 
and its small number of members. Given its role during the dictatorship, and the general popular 
perception that workers are too vulnerable under the current economic system, CUT enjoys 
workers’ support even when it defends the interests of well-paid CODELCO (state-owned 
copper company) workers, adversely affecting the interest of the general working class. Public 
opinion tends to associate the CUT with left-wing parties. The policy episodes discussed below 
present further evidence to illustrate these conclusions. In what follows, we describe the 
analytical frameworks used in the paper. Sections 3 and 4 present the productivity story of Chile 
in light of these frameworks. Before presenting our six case studies, we analyze productivity-
relevant institutions and actors and their effects on the policymaking process with respect to 
productivity.  
 
2.  The Policymaking Process and Policy Outcomes 
 
Our political economy analytical framework is based on the political transaction-cost model 
proposed by Spiller and Tommasi (2003, 2007) and Murillo et al. (2008). Our analysis of 
productivity determinants is based on the framework proposed by Xavier Sala-i-Martín in his 
work for the World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index (2008). Spiller and Tommasi 
(2003) argue that policy outcomes (Y) are determined by the characteristics of the policymaking 
process by which the policy is produced (designed, approved, and implemented). The lower the 
  4transaction costs faced by political and social actors in their intertemporal policy exchanges, the 
higher the expected cooperation and the higher the quality of policy outcomes. In this view, 
policymaking games are specific to each policy area and result from the interaction of the 
general policymaking game of the country (X) with the characteristics of each policy area (Z). 
Good policy outcomes are those in which policies are stable when confronted with political 
shocks, flexible with respect to socioeconomic shocks, well coordinated, and highly regarded by 
the public. When there are low transaction costs and long time horizons, actors can cooperate to 
find the best policy responses to social issues. The characteristics of the PMPs (X) are given by 
the interaction of history and political and economic institutions. PMPs with low transaction 
costs result when that interaction generates few actors that interact repeatedly over long time 
horizons, in transparent arenas (observable moves) with relatively low short-term payoffs, and 
good enforcement mechanisms. Institutions and factors relevant for the PMP are the legal 
system, the electoral system, political party regulations (laws that regulate the formation of 
parties, their internal procedures, candidate selection, and party and campaign financing) 
transparency, conflict of interests, and lobbying legislation, norms regulating the legislative 
process, the balance of powers among the branches of government, the independence of the 
judiciary, the independence of the central bank, banking system regulations and anti-monopoly 
regulations, among others. 
Spiller and Tommasi (2007) and Murillo et al. (2008) enrich the model, identifying the 
effects that specific characteristics of social actors and of each policy area (Z) have on the 
relevant policymaking game and ultimately on policy outcomes. They focus on the 
characteristics of social actors (socioeconomic interests), the conditions and mechanisms that 
allow them to influence the PMP, the arenas where they interact, and the policy domains in 
which they choose to intervene. The Z-characteristics include the number of major social actors, 
their level of aggregation, their collective action capabilities and resources, the way in which 
they articulate their demands, the breadth of their policy interests, their time horizons, and the 
fragmentation—both spatial and temporal—of policy domains, among others. 
We contribute to the analytical framework by identifying mechanisms though which social 
actors and additional characteristics of policy issues affect the workings of policymaking 
processes within each policy area (Z). Given that the policies needed at different levels of 
development have different characteristics, the effects of policymaking processes over policy 
  5outcomes are not linear. PMPs’ effects over policy outcomes are specific to levels of 
development and development strategies.  
The characteristics of the PMPs for specific policy areas and the specific characteristics of 
policy issues (ž) within these areas matter for the quality of policy outcomes. For this reason, we 
suggest that the appropriate unit of analysis is the specific policy issue, not the general policy 
area. As stated by Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003) and Murillo et al. (2008), the specific 
institutions that regulate a particular policy area, interacting with the institutions of the country, 
affect the dynamics of the specific PMP of that area, the participating actors, and transparency of 
movements, among other variables. However, the transaction costs of policy exchanges vary 
across policy issues within policy areas. Different policy issues involve different transaction 
costs and provide for different levels of transparency before public opinion.   
The complexity of policy issues together with the relative position of available policy 
responses vis-à-vis the status quo significantly affects the transaction costs of cooperation on that 
specific social issue.  The level of complexity of the issues—both the problems and the 
solutions—affects the visibility of the relevant actors’ behavior. In this context, the visibility of 
the moves by political actors is not determined only by the transparency of the negotiating arenas 
but also by the complexity of the issue for the electorate. 
The complexity of the problems (the degree of public understanding of the resulting 
negative effects of a particular social situation) determines whether the issue enters the public 
debate. Higher-complexity issues may not be understood by the media and the citizenry. Thus, 
despite appearing in newspapers and on the evening news, they may quickly fade away. When 
the issues do not draw the attention of the public, interested social and political actors can reach 
backroom agreements over policies arrived at privately without paying any electoral or political 
costs. Again, in oversimplified terms, the public will likely pay more attention to a school that 
was badly built or school textbooks that were defectively printed than to a more complex policy 
reform which results in teachers being inadequately rewarded for their performance.  
The complexity of solutions (public understanding of the available policy responses to the 
social issue at hand) determines whether political actors are accountable to their constituencies 
for their policy positions once an issue has taken center stage in the public debate. The 
complexity of public understanding of the effects of the available policy responses is affected by 
whether or not there is a technical agreement on the most appropriate policy response to a 
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serve the interests of the whole community; and by the relative standing of the available policy 
responses with vested interests and the general ideological leanings of the population over the 
issue at hand. The existence of technical consensus on a policy issue helps in making the 
behavior of political actors on behalf of narrow interests apparent to the electorate. But when 
citizens hold strong ideological views on policy issues, it is easier for political actors to defend 
vested interests on ideological grounds.  As a result, political actors can make their moves 
politically less visible. 
Obscure policy issues, however, can be made more visible by “policy champions” or by 
external shocks that change the relative costs of different policy stances by decision makers. As 
illustrated by some of the policy episodes discussed below, political and social actors may affect 
the degree of public understanding of policy issues (both problems and solutions), therefore 
increasing their visibility. For example, a corruption scandal in 2003 created a window of 
opportunity that led to the approval of a state reform long sought without success by the right-
wing coalition. In this context, the social issues most likely to generate good policy outcomes are 
those in which both the problem and the solution are visible to the electorate and can be easily 
related to voters’ wellbeing. In the case of mining, for example, historical developments create a 
widely shared perception that copper is a natural engine of national growth and development. 
Thus, the issue can be more effectively framed before public opinion than a more obscure and 
complex issue of commodities market reform or pension reform, even if those latter reforms 
have a more measurable and direct effect on growth, development, and people’s wellbeing.   
Ideological intensity and fragmentation are related variables that affect transaction costs of 
the general PMP. History determines the general ideological leaning of the population, which 
affects the ideological intensity and fragmentation of the electorate over policy issues. In Chile, 
the history of the 20 years prior to the formation of the post-Pinochet political system—growing 
political polarization in the 1960s, Allende’s “Chilean road to socialism,” and the military 
dictatorship’s human rights abuses and economic reforms—generated a highly ideological and 
polarized electorate. At one extreme, some voters believe that the largely unregulated economic 
model inherited from the military government is best for growth and that regulations and social 
protection are detrimental to the economy. At the other extreme, other voters think that the 
“Chicago Boys” economic model generated a ruthless brand of capitalism that has left the 
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a bimodal distribution along these two extremes in which most of the population is located away 
from the center.  (As explained below, this historical trend is reinforced by the current electoral 
system.) This distribution is reinforced and preserved by the electoral system, which generates 
two-party coalitions located away from the median voter.  
Ideological representation of legislative initiatives and policy reforms plays a significant 
role in policymaking. The right-leaning electorate’s policy perspective tends to oppose the 
implementation of policies that imply regulating the economy and increasing social protection. 
Conversely, the leftist electorate holds the opposite view, that any increase in regulation and 
social protection is good for the population. Before public opinion, right-wing political views can 
be characterized as advocating a smaller state and left-wing views as advocating a larger state. 
Thus, even when a debate entails no significant change to the public sector’s share of GDP, 
public debates are framed in terms of one extreme advocating for a greater role for the state 
(estatistas) while the other extreme is caricatured as seeking to shrink the state even further 
(neoliberals).   
This polarized ideological distribution has obscured the public policy debate—especially 
in areas that by definition and nature are inevitably complex and even obscure—and facilitated 
the capture of the two main political coalitions by large corporations, on the one hand, and by 
organized labor on the other. Under free-market arguments, right-wing parties have been able to 
implement pro-business rather than pro-market policies, while the Concertación has tended to 
favor unions over general workers and the poor. This phenomenon of obscuring the policy 
debate on ideological grounds has decreased the visibility of social problems and policy 
solutions across the board. 
The likelihood of political cooperation over policy issues is also affected by the spatial 
position of available solutions vis-à-vis the status quo and actors’ preferences. The larger the win 
set, the higher the chances for cooperation. When a large number of actors are affected by the 
possible policy solution, high complexity of the distribution of benefits and costs of the reform 
increases the difficulty of reaching an agreement. In the education reform discussed below, there 
were several actors affected in very different ways; thus it was extremely difficult to design a 
reform package to compensate the actors who were negatively affected.  
  8A related factor affecting the transaction costs of reforms is whether specific exchange 
currencies exist to compensate the negatively affected interests. For example in the state reform 
case study, the government coalition was negatively affected by the introduction of a 
meritocratic system for senior civil servants, as it lost the possibility to politically appoint them. 
The reform introduced simultaneously compensation in the form of public financing for political 
campaigns.  
 
3.  Productivity-Enhancing Policies and Stages of Development 
 
Since Solow (1957), most methodologies that measure aggregate productivity have concentrated 
on calculating Total Factor Productivity (TFP). In essence, TFP is a residual from an accounting 
process embracing several, perhaps too many, aspects of economic performance. The number 
obtained is not very useful for deciding what to do to enhance productivity. Recently, 
competitiveness literature has suggested several indicators which, because they are derived from 
a comparative analysis, provide a more accurate picture of a country’s current competitive 
situation. Probably the best known is the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Competitiveness 
Index, based on 12 different pillars. It is produced for more than a hundred countries around the 
world.  
The WEF methodology suggests that economies should be seen as evolving agents that 
pass through different stages of development. As suggested by Sala-i-Martín et al. (2008), in the 
first stage, an economy is factor-driven and countries normally compete based on their factor 
endowments, primarily unskilled labor and natural resources. Then, depending primarily on 
wage levels, which reflect companies’ productivity, countries move into the efficiency-driven 
stage of development, when they must begin to develop more efficient production processes and 
increase product quality. At this point, competitiveness is increasingly driven by higher 
education, efficient goods markets, and sophisticated financial markets. As countries move into 
the innovation-driven stage, they can sustain higher wages and higher living standards only if 
their businesses are able to compete with new products. At this stage, companies must compete 
through innovation, producing new and different goods using the most sophisticated production 
processes. 
The concept of stages of development is integrated into the Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI) by assigning greater weight to those pillars that are relatively more relevant for a country 
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indexes, each critical to a particular stage of development. The basic requirements sub-index 
groups those pillars most critical for countries in the factor-driven stage (institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health, and primary education). The efficiency 
enhancers sub-index includes those pillars critical for countries in the efficiency-driven stage 
(higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial 
market sophistication, technological readiness and market size). Finally, the innovation and 
sophistication factors sub-index includes the pillars critical to countries in the innovation-driven 
stage. 
In the following sections, we focus on the types of policies implemented in the last 20 years 
in light of the WEF analytical framework. Then, we analyze the institutions, actors, and 
workings of the policymaking process for productivity-related policies. Finally, we discuss six 
policy episodes that represent different types of policies and characterize the different dynamics 
present in the PMP.  
 
4.  Productivity in Chile since 1990 
 
During the golden years of economic growth (1984-1997), Chile’s impressive average annual 
growth rate of over 7 percent was mainly driven by productivity gains. In contrast, no 
productivity gains occurred during 1960-1985, and the country experienced very low TFP gains 
after 1997. As a result, GDP growth has declined as well. After 1997, the TFP decline seems to 
have responded to the absence of second- and third-generation socioeconomic reforms necessary 
to enhance productivity at higher levels of development. 
The basic economic reforms implemented correspond to what the WEF calls institutional 
reforms for a factor-driven economy. The first round of such reforms arose during the second 
half of the 1970s and established the basis for Chile’s current economic system. The country 
switched from serious macroeconomic imbalances and a high level of government intervention 
in the economy—including ISI (import substitution industrialization), basic price controls, 
financial market intervention, and state-owned companies in the financial markets and most 
economic activities—to a market-oriented economy. Major policies included the unilateral 
opening of the economy (setting a single tariff rate at 10 percent and a single exchange rate), 
price and wage liberalization, financial liberalization, privatization of public companies, and 
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period. The 1980s was marked by two major socioeconomic reforms with profound effects on 
long-term productivity: the replacement of the pay-as-you-go pension system by a private system 
based on individual capitalization accounts (AFP) and the transformation of the centralized 
public education system into a decentralized “voucher” system based on municipal and for-profit 
private schools. 
After the economic crisis of 1982, the country undertook a second wave of basic 
institutional reforms. The post-crisis period brought regulation of the financial market and an 
increase in the power vested in the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF). 
At the same time, the government divested most of its public utility companies (communication, 
energy), and an ambitious plan of privatization was launched. Finally, in 1989 the Central Bank 
of Chile became independent.  
The restoration of democracy in 1990 led to a third phase of economic reforms. The 
government complemented the unilateral trade liberalization of the 1980s with an extensive 
program of bilateral free trade agreements. Reforms also included the privatization of water 
utilities and the implementation of an ambitious and successful private infrastructure concession 
scheme for public works. A major judicial reform was also launched by the end of the 1990s, 
while reforms in capital markets (MK1, MK2) concerning IPOs and corporate governance were 
enacted. Additionally, the government strengthened its commitment to macroeconomic stability 
by launching a structural fiscal budget surplus rule. The Central Bank launched an inflation- 
targeting scheme, and the exchange rate regime moved gradually to a free float. Concertación 
governments expanded targeted social spending. Public policies coupled with strong economic 
growth led to sharp poverty reduction and improvement in health indicators. Education coverage 
expanded, but quality remains low by OECD standards. These policies consolidated and 
improved the system. The national policy debate therefore garnered major media attention and 
received significant public and political support from most relevant actors. They also generated 
considerable productivity gains.  
By the end of the decade, after implementing most structural reforms, it became apparent 
that an increasing number of policy reforms necessary to boost productivity were technically 
more complex. In terms of the WEF/Sala-i-Martín et al. (2008) categorization, the stage of 
development achieved by Chile required second- and third-generation reforms related to 
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Chile’s requires sources of growth fueled by “inspiration” rather than “perspiration.”  
Chile is an outlier among Latin American countries. In 2008, it ranked 28th in 
competitiveness worldwide. According to Sala-i-Martin et al. (2008), this performance is mainly 
explained by its sound macroeconomic management, together with timely market liberalization 
and opening to trade, all taking place within the context of a transparent and predictable 
regulatory framework. Specifically, Chile has successfully laid most of the basic foundations for 
competitiveness, including strong macroeconomic fundamentals (14th), well-developed 
infrastructure (30th), efficient institutions (37th), and a good health-care system (31st in the 
health sub-pillar). Moreover, it displays efficient goods (26th) and labor (17th) markets. 
However there are some aspects where the country performance is inadequate. Both basic 
(105th) and higher (50th) education receive poor to middling grades, which bodes poorly for the 
country’s capacity for knowledge generation and innovation. On the innovation pillar, Chile 
ranks well below (45th) its country average. 
 
5.  Institutions, Actors, and the Policymaking Process
2 
 
After summarizing Chile’s institutional arrangements and their effects on the policymaking 
process, we introduce a specific analysis of the characteristics of policies and the main social 
actors relevant for productivity related policymaking.    
A well designed system of checks and balances: Chile has a presidential system with a 
bicameral congress, a proportional electoral system with a district magnitude of two, and 
independent judiciary and other enforcement technologies. The system produces a PMP 
favorable to inter-temporal political transactions in most policy areas, as it generates a small 
number of relevant political actors who interact repeatedly with long time horizons, and there are 
good enforcement technologies overseeing the process.  
Checks and balances are designed to allow for slow but incremental change, preventing 
policy instability as a result of changes in the balance of political power. If these systems are 
well designed, however, they also allow for decisiveness when there are external shocks that 
change the relative costs of political issues. Checks and balances produce permanent and timely 
policy fine tuning in areas of relative consensus or in cases where compensation can be worked 
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gridlock on issues where political actors have strong opposing views.   
The current political institutional arrangements were established by the 1980 
Constitution, which introduced provisions to strengthen the agenda-setting power of the 
president and to solve common pool problems on matters such as fiscal policy. The military 
government carried out a major transformation of the economic system from a centralized 
economy to a free market economy largely unregulated by 1982. The severe effects of the 1982 
financial crisis led the government to introduce more regulations. The strong status quo bias of 
the policymaking process has allowed the minority right-wing political party coalition to block 
reform of the fundamentals of the economic system. The political process has been effective in 
protecting the main elements of the economic system while generating a stable but decisive 
policymaking process. It has allowed for an incremental improvement of policies, institutions, 
and rules and regulations. It has allowed for stability with respect to political shocks and for 
decisiveness with respect to socio-economic shocks. 
 
5.1 Institutional Determinants of the Policymaking Process 
 
A unitary state with a centralized government: There is no fiscal decentralization in Chile. 
During the twentieth century, Chile’s bureaucracy developed a reputation for low corruption, but 
was also marked by strong centralization, an emphasis on procedures rather than on outputs, poor 
coordination mechanisms, and no participation of civil society or market mechanisms in the 
provision of public services, making it rigid, relatively fragmented and not very efficient. 
Economic transformations carried out by the military dictatorship in the 1970s started an 
incremental process of reform that led to significant reforms since the 1990s during the Aylwin 
(1990-94), Frei (1994-00), Lagos (2000-06), and Bachelet (2006-10) administrations, all 
members of the center-left Concertación coalition. The military implemented structural 
economic reforms and reduced the size of the state by privatizing public companies and the 
social security system, deregulating markets, and improving the tax system. These reforms, 
however, were carried out in an ideological environment contrary to empowering the state, 
which led to under-investing in institutional capacity and modernization of the delivery of public 
services. 
  13After the end of the dictatorship, as both the nascent democracy and the new economic 
institutions were consolidated, gradual reform of the civil service continued to unfold. The most 
important legislation addressed simplifying administrative procedures, updating the level of 
remuneration of high public officials, reducing the amount of undisclosed funds, 
professionalizing the civil service in order to improve and develop long-term careers in the civil 
service regardless of political changes, and addressing access to information, transparency, 
lobbying and conflict of interest issues. Despite the effort to improve the capabilities of the state, 
the bureaucracy is still too rigid, fragmented, and procedure oriented. The state has poor 
coordination arrangements at the central government level. The office of the president has a 
small staff, politically appointed, and there are no permanent structures in charge of coordination 
of inter-sectoral programs. This fragmentation of the policy space is compounded by coalition 
governments. The electoral system leads to the formation of coalition governments in which the 
ministries are managed by cabinet members of different political parties.   
Strong presidential system: Chile has one of the strongest presidential systems in Latin 
America. The Executive has exclusive legislative initiative in several policy areas, a highly 
hierarchical control of the budget process, and an array of “urgency” and veto options, which 
make it a de facto agenda-setter. Yet, capable lawmakers and a long legislative process with 
supermajorities for most economic policies impose on the Executive the need to negotiate its 
legislative agenda. Presidents are elected for four-year terms and banned from running for 
immediate re-election. The nomination process has varied since 1990, but the two main 
coalitions have presented candidates for every election and have dominated the elections. All 
four presidential elections have been won by Concertación candidates.  
The president’s constitutionally mandated legislative and non-legislative powers are 
substantial. Its non-legislative powers include broad authority to nominate, appoint, and dismiss 
government officials. With Senate approval, the president can nominate Supreme Court justices, 
members to the Central Bank’s governing board, three of the ten members of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, and the Comptroller General. This procedure ensures a politically balanced nomination 
to key institutional posts. The president appoints all cabinet ministers, regional and provincial 
governors, ambassadors and heads of government agencies and state companies. Given that the 
electoral system fosters coalition governments, cabinet formation might be negatively affected 
by reducing the cabinet’s cohesion. However, the highly hierarchical structure of the cabinet, 
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of the finance minister in determining the budget of each ministry, has produced relatively 
efficient cabinets. The degree of support for the president in Congress is relatively high and 
constant under the current electoral system. The binomial electoral system leads to rather similar 
congressional representation for each coalition in Congress. In this context, support for the 
Executive in Congress oscillates around 50 percent in all legislatures. 
A bicameral Congress: Chile has a 38-member Senate and a 120-member Chamber of 
Deputies. Both chambers use the binominal electoral system, without term limits. Deputies are 
elected from 60 two-member districts for four-year terms, and senators are elected from 19 two-
member districts for eight-year terms with a staggered renewal every four years.  Two main 
institutions shape the workings of Congress: the executive boards (mesas) of each chamber and 
the chambers’ committees. Formal rules determine that committee assignments do not depend on 
seniority but on the mesas’ nomination and ratification by the respective chamber, and they 
proportionally reflect the partisan composition of each chamber. In actuality, however, the mesas 
consider the parties’ requests for committee assignments.  
Independent and politically insulated enforcement mechanisms: The main enforcement 
technologies overseeing the political system are the Judiciary, the Constitutional Tribunal and 
the Comptroller General (CGR). The Constitution establishes their independence from other 
branches of the government and their institutional design accomplishes that goal. All three 
institutions have nomination procedures that assure their political insulation and independence 
from other branches of the state and avoid partisan biases in their composition.  
The 21 Supreme Court justices are nominated by the president from a five-person list 
proposed by the Court, and have to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. The Constitutional 
Tribunal is composed of 10 members—three chosen by the president, two by the Senate, two by 
the Chamber of Deputies with Senate approval, and three by the Supreme Court—for staggered 
nine-year terms. Three members are renewed every three years.  As a result of the 2005 
constitutional reforms, the Tribunal now has more powers and responsibilities. Constitutional 
challenges can be brought to the Tribunal by the executive, legislative and judicial branches, but 
individuals can also challenge the constitutionality of some government actions.  The rulings of 
the Tribunal are not subject to appeals, though it can rectify previous rulings if it independently 
decides to do so. The CGR is also autonomous and independent. The Comptroller General is 
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old, unless impeached by the Senate based on a constitutional accusation by the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Even though all three enforcement technologies are nominated by other powers of the 
state, a correct combination of checks and balances assures their political independence. In all 
cases, those who aspire to hold these offices cannot cater to the interests of one branch of the 
state alone and, once nominated, their non-removability insulates them politically. 
The electoral system, party legislation, and coalition politics: Chile has two different 
electoral systems for legislative and presidential elections, which give different incentives to 
political actors and cross-pressure them in their electoral strategies. Parliamentary elections 
occur under a proportional representation system with a district magnitude of two in all districts 
(the binominal system). It uses open lists, with two candidates per list, and the d’Hondt seat 
allocation formula. It allows for nationally binding coalition formation. Each coalition receiving 
the two highest vote shares wins one of the two seats per district unless the list receiving the 
most votes doubles the votes of its second-place rival, in which case it receives both seats. By 
introducing high barriers to entry, the electoral system has a two-fold effect on the party system. 
On the one hand, it reduces the number of relevant actors by encouraging parties to coalesce. On 
the other, it reduces electoral competition and strengthens the national leadership of parties.  
Since 1990, there have been six parties with congressional representation, organized into 
two national coalitions, with center and left-wing parties that opposed Pinochet in one coalition, 
the  Concertación, and right-wing parties that supported him in the other, the Alianza. The 
Concertación and the Alianza have remained as the only two coalitions with congressional 
representation and have become the longest-standing coalitions in Chile’s long republican 
history. The ruling center-left Concertación comprises four parties (Christian Democratic PDC, 
Social-Democratic PPD, Socialist PS and Social Democratic PRSD). The right-of-center Alianza 
opposition is made up of two parties (the conservative Independent Democratic Union, UDI, and 
the more liberal National Renewal, RN). In addition, the Communist Party (PC) and Humanist 
Party (PH) also have local elected officials but no parliamentary representation. Though an 
overwhelming majority of legislators come from the Concertación and Alianza, independents 
have occasionally won seats as well.  
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restrictions. Since only one-third of the vote is needed to secure half of the seats in each district, 
it drives parties’ platforms away from the median voter. This polarizing effect of the electoral 
system perpetuates the ideological divide of the electorate inherited from the 1988 Plebiscite. 
The mediating effects of the presidential electoral system reduce its centrifugal incentives. Also, 
the potentially high price a party would pay if it unilaterally left its coalition enforces high intra-
coalition discipline. This has helped maintain unity in both coalitions, since they include parties 
with different platforms on several issues and political leaders with high personal rivalries. 
Despite publicized intra-coalition bickering, both coalitions have remained united by the pressure 
of their legislators in their respective party’s leadership. Members of Congress know that their 
chances for re-election would be jeopardized should their coalitions break up. 
The binomial system also encourages continuous intra-coalition party negotiations to 
decide which candidates will be included in the coalition’s lists in every district, strengthening, 
to a certain extent, the national leadership of parties. The lack of regulations on candidate 
selection procedures has led to back-room negotiations, as opposed to primaries, increasing the 
opacity of parties’ internal workings. Each party has to negotiate with its partners the districts in 
which it presents candidates while responding to both national and local considerations. On the 
one hand, parties have to negotiate their share of the coalition’s candidate list, and on the other, 
they have to try to get into districts where the party has candidates with strong local support.  
In legislative elections, the binomial system normally gives each of the two main 
coalitions a secure seat in most districts. This in turn allows coalitions to present candidates 
responding to strategic national interests instead of voters’ preferences. This has a negative effect 
on the transparency of party policy preference formation. As parties do not need to cater to 
median voter preferences, in issues with low visibility they can represent private interests 
without risking electoral failure. Moreover, as candidates need to obtain the party nomination to 
run in the coalition’s list, parties can impose discipline on their behavior. As congressmen have 
long legislative careers, given no term-limit provisions and high entry barriers for challenges 
outside the two main coalitions, there is low leadership turnover. That in turn contributes to the 
perpetuation of the ideological orientations of parties. Seventy-five percent of members of 
Congress are re-nominated and about 60 percent are re-elected (Carey, 2002). The binomial 
system has three distinct effects: it reduces the number of relevant actors to a few parties 
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for powerful and stable party leadership whose power is strengthened by the informal rules that 
determine the Congress’ authorities, and it provides high congressional support for the 
Executive.  
Presidential elections have a majoritarian electoral system with run-off provisions. This 
system induces the nomination of moderate candidates who seek the median voter position. 
Since only two large coalitions having congressional representation, this system induces intra-
coalition negotiations to nominate one candidate for each coalition, which in turn reinforces 
coalition cohesion and discipline. 
Similar intra-coalition horse trading has taken place when selecting the presidential 
candidate. In 1993 and 1999, Concertación held national primaries to select its presidential 
candidate. Yet in 2005 and 2009, presidential candidate selection took place without national 
primaries. Though polls were widely used by parties to bargain in favor of their candidates, the 
fact that those polls were taken in the absence of a formal campaign links the results to an ex-
ante popularity of a candidate rather than to an intention by voters. The combined effect of the 
binominal and presidential electoral systems on politicians, parties, and coalitions is a set of 
incentives which cross-pressure them and multiply the opportunities for intra-coalition leadership 
negotiation.  
The legislation for political parties established by the Pinochet regime has remained 
largely unchanged. It allows political parties to function in opacity, particularly regarding 
selection mechanisms and financing. Despite the existence of some legal transparency and 
procedural requirements for the selection of party officials, in practice party officials and 
candidates for public office are nominated behind closed doors. This, together with reduced 
militant base and low electoral competition, facilitates undue influence by special interests. 
 
5.2 The Legislative Process: An Agenda-setting President vs. a Gate-keeping Congress 
 
Given the substantial agenda-setting powers of the president and a carefully designed balance of 
powers between the president and Congress, the president dictates the legislative agenda and 
Congress decides final approval of legislative initiatives. The president cannot advance his/her 
legislative agenda without the votes of a qualified majority for most major legislative reforms. 
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president to bypass Congress to approve legislation (Aninat, 2007).  
The constitutionally mandated agenda-setting powers enjoyed by the president are 
substantial. The Executive has sole legislative initiative over legislation concerning the political 
and administrative divisions of the state, its financial administration, the budget process, and the 
sale of state assets. Additionally, the Executive has sole initiative in areas such as taxation, labor 
regulation, social security, and the Armed Forces. The Executive has sole authority to initiate 
legislation that requires budget increases or allocation of new funds, which gives it exclusive 
legislative initiative over most economic policy areas. The Executive also controls the flow of 
legislation through the use of “urgencies”—a constitutional mechanism designed to give the 
Executive the power to force a rapid legislature vote on an initiative. The Ley Orgánica 
Constitucional del Congreso Nacional (#18,918) provides for three different types of 
urgencies—30, 10, and 3 days, respectively— that can be introduced or withdrawn at will by the 
Executive at any moment during the legislative process. Urgencies are used strategically by the 
government to test the potential legislative support for its initiatives and to control the order of 
the day in legislative committees and floor consideration of bills. Although it is weak when 
compared to the U.S. Congress, the Chilean legislature is unusually professional and technically 
competent by Latin American standards.  The lack of term limits and high entry barriers for 
challengers allow legislators to develop long legislative careers. 
The legislative process consists of three “constitutional steps” (trámites constitucionales). 
The first step begins when a legislative initiative is submitted by the president to a chamber of 
her choice. Individual legislators and groups of legislators can also submit legislative initiatives, 
but they are rarely considered by Congress. The respective chamber assigns the initiative to one 
of its standing committees or to a specially assigned joint committee, depending on the nature of 
the initiative. The committee then discusses the bill “in general” and can modify the initiative at 
will. Regardless of the committee’s vote on the initiative, the chamber votes on the amended 
initiative presented to the floor by the committee. If amendments are offered during the general 
discussion, this triggers a second reading of the bill, called discussion in particular. At this stage, 
the bill is returned to the committee, and all amendments are discussed. Typically, the chamber 
will agree to extend the deadline for presenting amendments. Once this period has passed, the 
committee discusses and votes on the new amendments. The bill, along with any adopted 
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the second reading, and in the Senate, committee members must put each proposed amendment 
to a publicly reported vote.  
Once the first legislative step is completed, the initiative moves to the other chamber for 
the second legislative step. A similar process ensues. But since an initiative that cleared the first 
hurdle is closer to final passage, the second chamber often votes first on the intention to legislate 
(idea de legislar) the project as a package (en general) and in the end, the truly important vote is 
on the specific articles of the legislation after it has passed the respective committees.  
At this stage, if both chambers have approved the same version of the bill, it is sent to the 
president for his signature or veto. However, if the chambers have approved distinct versions of 
the bill (e.g., if the revising chamber has sustained any amendments) the bill is referred to a 
conference committee made up of an equal number of members from both chambers and chaired 
by a member of the Senate. For bills referred to a single committee, the Senate conferees are 
typically the members of the relevant committee. Deputies’ committees tend to be larger (13 
members vs.  5 for the Senate), so not all of the deputies from the relevant committee are 
involved in the conference committee. The bill put forth by the conference committee is put to an 
up or down vote in each chamber, without the possibility of amendment.  
If and when both chambers have approved the same version of the bill, it goes to the 
president. She can sign the bill, in which case it often goes to the Constitutional Tribunal for 
approval of its consistency with existing constitutional provisions, if 15 members of Congress or 
the president so request or if provisions about the constitutionality of the objected part of the 
norm have been raised during the legislative process. Objections at this stage tend to be 
genuinely related to constitutional issues, so the Constitutional Tribunal does not act as a third 
legislative chamber. If the president does not wish to sign the bill, he can veto it in whole or in 
part and send it back to Congress. Congress must first vote (up or down, no amendments) on the 
“observations.” Only if these are rejected, Congress proceeds to vote on veto override, which for 
most laws requires the approval of three-fifths of the members present in each chamber. If the 
veto is overridden, or if “observations” are accepted, the bill is promulgated. If a successful 
partial presidential veto applies, then the remainder of the bill is promulgated.  
Constitutionally mandated supermajority thresholds for some special legislation contribute 
to offsetting the Executive’s substantial agenda-setting power. They range from an absolute 
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the members. Those provisions permit a minority in one chamber to block legislation. With the 
exception of the weakest threshold (a majority of total membership), the Concertación has 
always faced the need to negotiate changes to legislation that require supermajority approval 
with the conservative opposition in at least one legislative chamber. These high thresholds, 
together with the repeated interaction of the president with Congress for long time horizons, have 
led to tit-for-tat equilibrium legislative strategy. “Consensus politics” have emerged as the 
president negotiates with the opposition on bills requiring qualified majorities and most other 
legislative initiatives.   
 
5.4 Major Actors in the Policymaking of Productivity  
 
In addition to the business and labor actors emphasized by Murillo et al. (2008), we identify 
other categories that can be as influential, such as think tanks and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). For each category we identify their preferences, the channels through 
which they exert political influence, and their influence on the policy outcomes of the case 
studies covered in the paper. Socioeconomic actors participate in the PMP in Chile at a high 
level of aggregation, either through business organizations, labor unions, or influential think 
tanks and NGOs.   
Business Organizations: The corporate sector is well organized in multilayered business 
federations that represent all areas of economic activity. They have high media standing; they 
interact repeatedly with the Executive and political parties in negotiations that affect their 
interests. Moreover, the lack of transparent and well-designed campaign financing mechanisms 
allows interest groups to exert unobservable influence on parties and think tanks’ legislative 
agendas.  
Other social actors include business associations and economic conglomerates. Since the 
mid twentieth century, a number of business associations have emerged to advocate for their 
particularistic interests. The Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (SNA) brings together most large 
and mid-size agro-industrial entrepreneurs. The Cámara Chilena de la Construcción (CChC) 
brings together the construction and infrastructure sector. Altogether, six such business 
associations form the Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio (CPC), the association that 
defends the interests of the entrepreneurial class. After having actively participated in shaping 
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promoted import-substituting industrialization, these business sector organizations opposed the 
socialist Allende government (1970-73) and then enthusiastically supported the Pinochet 
dictatorship—but also opposed some liberalizing and market-friendly policies adopted under 
military rule. Then, these organizations slowly withdrew from an open political role when 
democracy was restored. In part because the policies championed by Concertación governments 
had produced positive results and also because it was in the best interest of their organizations to 
develop and maintain good relations with the government—regardless of the political color of 
the party in power—the business organizations made their own transition away from 
authoritarian rule. Most recently, the CPC has elected a former Allende supporter-turned 
businessman as its leader in 2008. 
The “size” and “formality” variables in Murillo et al. (2008) explain why the business 
sector is highly aggregated through very organized and powerful associations. As expected, 
SMEs are the main absent socioeconomic actors. Small firms across sectors probably hold 
different preferences and thus are organized, when they are, in different associations. The 
shorter-run approach of these associations makes coordination of collective action difficult. 
Hence, they tend to be underrepresented in the negotiating arenas around policy issues that affect 
them. 
As remarked in Murillo et al. (2008), large companies can be powerful enough to define 
policy preferences and policy influence. The pro-business rather than pro-market preferences of 
these organizations find a space in the negotiating arenas of the PMP mainly through a set of 
pressure mechanisms, which are likely to rely on a combination of economic and political tools. 
Their influence can be exerted through informal networks with political parties, the threat of 
disinvestment (and its impact in national economic variables), and/or financial inducements for 
electoral campaigns or personal enrichment. 
Informal networks between business associations and political parties can be of special 
importance for a small country with an unequal income distribution and where economic power 
is highly concentrated. A survey of managers of big companies revealed that 50 percent of them 
graduated from five schools, all of them private schools serving high-income families. Since 
only 7 percent of children are enrolled in such schools, business power is highly concentrated 
among the relative few that belong to the higher income group. According to Espinoza (2008), 
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facilitating the development of a social network among businesspeople and political actors who 
grew up in the same milieu. Even though the document states that school networks are weaker 
than those developed through higher education, there are other sources of informal networking, 
or “secondary circles of sociability” that can be used as channels to exert influence. 
Labor unions: Historical episodes added to our specific economic conditions have led to 
stronger, more organized public sector federations. Teachers, public health sector employees, 
and public employees in general are well organized and play an important role in the electoral 
base of the Concertación. Some of these labor unions are: CUT (National Association of 
Unions), ANEF (National Federation of Public Sector Workers), the Teachers Union, the Health 
Workers Union, the Municipal Employees Union and the state-owned copper giant CODELCO 
workers union. The preferences of these socioeconomic players are related mainly to the 
maximization of job stability and salary increases based on seniority rather than performance. 
Concertación parties—most notably PDC and PS—have strong ties to labor unions. 
Public sector unions are among the strongest in Chile, including the powerful CODELCO union. 
Most unions are controlled by PS and PDC militants. The PC, to the left of the Concertación, 
also has a strong presence in the labor unions. In fact, PC militants led the CUT for several years 
in the 1990s. The CUT’s current president is a member of the Socialist Party, but the strength of 
the PC in the union movement often leads socialist militants to take positions to the left of the 
Concertación and even to the left of the PS within the Concertación. Other powerful labor 
unions include the Teachers Union (Colegio de Profesores) where the PC has commanding 
support, and the Health Professionals and Health Workers Unions (CONFUSAM), where the PS 
commands strongest support.   
The influence of unions within the party apparatus is far larger than their membership 
numbers would seem to indicate. Unions can mobilize organized voters and become crucial in 
helping man campaigns and providing avenues to disseminate information to politically 
sophisticated unionized workers. This is mainly due to their ideological features. Public workers 
(from the education, mining, health and state sector, among others) lean toward leftist ideology, 
so they are more prone to support organized leftist associations that defend, or seem to defend, 
public workers’ rights from a left-wing point of view. Thus, even though they are not formal 
members of these associations, they feel represented by them. This situation put these 
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PMP (mainly left-wing political parties), especially when the problems and solutions in a 
specific policy area are less visible and more complex.  
The limited understanding by public workers of complex problems and solutions, added 
to their left-wing ideological leaning, gives enough space to unions to act under opacity, 
promoting actions related to vested interests at the expense of more technical solutions. Given 
the strong influence of unions over the citizens they represent, whether formally or informally,  
and the power they have to threaten political stability through demonstrations, political parties—
especially the PS and PDC—find it difficult to adopt policy positions that will alienate their 
strong union base of support. Hence, political parties are the main channel through which these 
socioeconomic players influence the policymaking process. 
Think tanks and NGOs: Think tanks and NGOs play an active role in the policymaking 
process, both technical and political. Think tanks are independent and privately financed, but 
most are close to one or more political parties.  There is a two-way relationship between the 
parties and think tanks. Think tanks provide legislative assistance in exchange for advancing 
their ideological agendas. The lack of congressional staffers to support the legislative work of 
legislators reinforces this relationship. Other social organizations, such as NGOs (Paz 
Ciudadana, the Chilean Chapter of Transparency International) and the churches (traditionally 
Catholic but increasingly others) play an important role in the aggregation and representation of 
social preferences in the PMP.  
Political parties are highly disciplined and organized, but they mostly lack technical 
expertise. Parties are much more concerned with organizing militants to run and win elections 
than with preparing technocrats who can design and analyze public policies. Thus, think tanks 
have emerged as the policy arm of the two coalitions.  Given that the executive controls the 
legislative agenda, opposition parties can only react to government-sponsored legislation. 
Because bargaining is often necessary for the government to achieve majority and supermajority 
support in Congress to advance its legislative initiatives, opposition think tanks advise opposition 
legislators on which issues they should compromise on and on which items they should stick to 
their initial positions. In fact, it is often the case that government ministers negotiate directly 
with representatives of policy experts from opposition think tanks who also formally serve as 
legislative assistants for opposition senators and deputies.  
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tank that provides the UDI with policy recommendations and advice on how to vote on the 
government’s proposed legislation. For RN, Instituto Libertad (IL, a different think tank) serves 
the same purpose. Because it is better funded and staffed, and because it has had a more constant 
leadership, LyD has emerged as the most influential think tank within the Alianza. Also, because 
the UDI is a much more disciplined and top-down party, LyD can better influence the positions 
of UDI legislators than IL can the position of RN congresspersons.  
As non-profit corporations, think tanks can receive tax-deductible private funding from 
companies and interested parties but are not required to release information on the sources of 
funding they receive. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence—widely reported in newspapers and 
talked about among Concertación and Alianza legislators—that LyD receives funding from 
companies and entrepreneurs associated with the most conservative positions within the Catholic 
Church and with close ties to state companies privatized during the Pinochet dictatorship. LyD is 
the think tank most closely aligned with the neoliberal economic policies promoted by the 
Pinochet dictatorship. Former Finance Minister under Pinochet, Hernán Büchi serves on the 
Council of Advisors.  Buchi’s former chief of staff in the Ministry of Finance, Cristián Larroulet, 
is the executive director of LyD. Former Chief of Cabinet of the Pinochet regime, Carlos 
Cáceres, presides over the Council of Advisors.   
Instituto Libertad, on the other hand, consists primarily of technocrats associated with 
RN. As a nonprofit corporation, IL gets funding from private sources as well. Its positions are 
regularly more liberal than those of LyD, but IL has less influence over RN legislators, produces 
fewer policy papers, and announces fewer policy positions than LyD. IL is also involved with 
helping organize campaigns for RN. In UDI, that role is mostly played by the Fundación Jaime 
Guzmán, a non-profit that occasionally also defends specific policy positions.  
In addition, the influential Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) serves as supplier of policy 
positions for right-wing legislators. The policy positions announced and defended by the 
independent CEP occasionally serve as a signaling device for right-wing legislators. CEP was 
originally created by the Matte family—one of the wealthiest family conglomerates in Chile, 
with financial interests in forestry, electricity, and almost every other sector of the Chilean 
economy. CEP is funded by contributions from private donations—mostly private companies—
and its non-partisan ideology champions the defense of market-friendly policies and liberal 
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depth studies on state modernization, campaign finance, and economic policies have directly 
influenced debates. Occasionally, Concertación governments have sought to negotiate policy 
agreements with CEP in order to obtain legitimacy before presenting its legislative initiatives to 
Congress. Thus, the Concertación has used CEP to bypass the think tanks more directly 
associated with the Alianza.  
Think-tanks are also important for the Concertación. But since the center-left coalition 
has continuously occupied the executive branch in Chile since the restoration of democracy, 
technocrats are often lured into government positions from Concertación-friendly think tanks. 
For example, after Michelle Bachelet was elected president, she appointed three ministers—
including the finance minister—from among members of the liberal-leaning and Concertación-
friendly Expansiva think tank. Similarly, in 1990, President Patricio Aylwin recruited many of 
his technocrats—including his finance minister, Alejandro Foxley—from the Cieplan think tank.  
Thus, Concertación think tanks have failed to remain as permanent actors in the political 
arena. They form and, when successful, they are rapidly recruited into the executive. Because the 
executive effectively controls the legislative agenda and drafts most relevant legislative 
initiatives, Concertación think-tank technocrats have every incentive to join the government. As 
a result, Concertación think tanks are much weaker and more poorly staffed than Alianza think 
tanks.  This adversely affects Concertación legislators, who have little technical support vis-à-vis 
the Concertación government when discussing policy reforms. Except for those legislators who 
develop a personal interest in specific policy issues, Concertación legislators can count on less 
technical support and expert advice when exercising their legislative role.  
 
5.5 The Policymaking of Productivity in Chile  
 
The political institutions established by the military regime in the Constitution of 1980 were 
designed to generate a political system with a strong status quo bias in order to protect—under 
democratic politics—the dictatorship’s economic and institutional legacy.  The ensuing PMP 
proved to be conducive to good and responsible policymaking, generating the largest economic 
expansion in Chilean history together with improvement in most social indicators (Aninat el al., 
2008). The constitutional reform of 2005 eliminated the “undemocratic enclaves” but did not 
alter the incentive structure established by the original Constitution. 
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structure of incentives and restrictions on actors’ behavior. It has two main effects on the 
policymaking process for productivity: a PMP generally conducive to inter-temporal cooperation 
and, within this cooperative framework, a strong status quo bias, since most policy reforms need 
the support of both government and opposition coalitions. As analyzed by Aninat et al. (2008), 
institutions generate a system with few actors, interacting repeatedly, over long time horizons, in 
mostly transparent negotiating arenas, and under the oversight of politically insulated 
enforcement mechanisms. Concentration of the agenda-setting power in the president facilitates 
public accountability, therefore inducing the president to internalize the general national interest.  
An essential aspect of the Chilean PMP is the centralization of agenda-setting power in the 
executive and the gatekeeping role played by the opposition in Congress (Aninat and Londregan, 
2006). This balance of powers explains two central features of the PMP. It induces the president 
to internalize the country’s general interest and to propose a consensual policy agenda. The 
Constitution assigns most of the legislative initiative to the president in order to avoid common 
pool problemsp—and “Christmas tree” bills—at the same time that it empowers Congress to 
authorize the financing of this agenda. The clear responsibility of the executive for the 
socioeconomic management of the country increases political accountability.  
The balance of partisan power in Congress, on the other hand, contributes to repeated 
negotiationn between the executive and the opposition, leading to more consensual politics—
what has been called “democracia de los acuerdos.” The Constitution establishes a delicate 
balance between the congressional representation of each coalition and the supermajorities 
required to approve all major socioeconomic reforms. The electoral system induces the 
formation of two large, disciplined party coalitions which obtain between 40 percent and 60 
percent of the seats. The most relevant supermajority threshold for socioeconomic reforms is 4/7 
(57.14 percent) of the members of each chamber. This implies that the government needs the 
consent of the opposition to pass major reforms. As explained above, given the repeated nature 
of their interaction, if the government imposes its preferred policies on areas that require simple 
majority it risks a “tit-for-tat” response of the opposition on qualified majority legislation. The 
combined institutional arrangement has helped consolidate a political agreement on responsible, 
non-populist macroeconomic management and the general socioeconomic system.  
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PMP. The human rights abuses, together with the imposition by non-democratic means of a new 
constitution and a new economic system, generated a deep ideological schism in the electorate.  
The two party coalitions formed as a result of the 1988 plebiscite mirror the sharp ideological 
divide regarding the legitimacy of the political and economic systems. This translates into a 
bimodal ideological distribution over socioeconomic policies. In this context, Chile has a very 
orderly policy debate, which delves into perfecting the new economic model to increase 
efficiency and competition, put in place sophisticated market regulations, and increase social 
protection. In the context of consensus politics in a cooperative PMP with a status quo bias, this 
implies slow but permanent policy reform without policy reversals. 
The Chilean policymaking process is less transparent and with greater policy spatial 
fragmentation than previously thought. Despite Chile’s transparent Congress as its main 
policymaking arena and a state bureaucracy with low corruption levels, some institutional and 
cultural features increase the obscurity of political actors’ moves. Three main determinants drive 
these results: i) opaque internal workings of political parties, ii) inadequate conflict of interest 
and campaign finance legislation, iii) increasingly complex productivity-enhancing policies, and 
iv) strong ideological biases of the electorate and policymakers. 
The main negotiating arenas are Congress, the Executive branch, and political parties. 
Though political parties play a fundamental role in Chilean politics, their internal workings are 
poorly regulated. Thus, the selection of party leadership and candidates to public office occurs in 
backroom negotiations rather than through primaries. The low competition of the binominal 
electoral system increases opportunities for politicians and parties to defend private interests 
without paying electoral costs. Chile’s high aggregation of socioeconomic actors reduces the 
number of negotiating parties, thus facilitating inter-temporal policy transactions.  At the same 
time, however, high aggregation in low-transparency arenas facilitates collusion to defend 
private interests, therefore facilitating capture of political parties´ policy preferences. 
The complexity of policy issues makes it harder for the electorate to understand the 
benefits and costs of alternative policy reforms, reducing the visibility of political actors’ moves. 
When the electorate is highly ideological, politicians can further obscure the policy debate by 
ideologically manipulating the public policy analysis. 
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outcomes since 1990.  First-generation structural policies have high social visibility, as they are 
easily understandable and their effects are easily measured. In a decisive, status quo bias PMP 
with a new socioeconomic model, first-generation reforms were easily agreed upon, but when 
efficiency-enhancing reforms became necessary to maintain high levels of productivity growth, 
the system was unable to deliver. Education reform presents a clear example. Education policy in 
the 1990s was focused on increasing coverage and received broad political support.  When the 
system achieved high coverage levels, the policy focus shifted to increasing quality, but there 
was no technical agreement on how to achieve this. The public could not understand the 
determinants of low performance of the system, and any reform implied costs to many private 
actors. In that context, for more than a decade it was not possible to reach an agreement on 
education reform.   
The fragmentation of the policy space is also a limitation in the Chilean PMP. In the past 
30 years, Chile’s bureaucracy has undergone substantial reform, but it is still too rigid and 
fragmented across ministries. There are outdated and inadequate horizontal coordination 
mechanisms, and at the center of government there is low coordination capacity (Aninat and 
Rivera, 2009). This is compounded by coalition politics. Coalition governments lead to assigning 
different ministries to different parties.  This, combined with the Weberian Chilean state, leads to 
fragmented policymaking in reinforcing ministries’ silo effect.  Different parties have different 
social constituencies and are closer to different social actors. In a party system with low 
transparency regarding the inner workings of parties, some social actors are able to capture 
policy in the different ministries, fragmenting the policy space with strong negative cross effects. 
The negative effects of lower transparency and fragmented policy space are higher for more 
complex, less visible policies. As Chile develops and high rates of productivity growth depend 
more on policies with higher complexity, the Chilean policymaking process has become 
increasingly less effective. 
Given the structure of the economy and the historical configuration of socioeconomic 
actors, Chile’s main interests are big business, unionized labor, and strong ideological divisions. 
This leads to an equilibrium in which organized labor lobbies the Concertación parties and 
governments for higher social protection—higher public spending, labor legislation, and a fully 
public education system. On the other hand, big business, through CPC, major economic 
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maintain the mostly unregulated economic system and limited government. The status quo bias 
of the PMP, together with the spatial fragmentation of the policy areas, has led to the 
maintenance of  a small state, with low social protection, and a high unregulated economic 
system with a few areas dominated by organized labor—CUT, Trabajadores del Cobre, ANEF, 
and Colegio de Profesores—leading to unnecessary labor-market rigidities,  such as no part-time 
regulation and high firing costs, disproportionately high wages for CODELCO’s workers, and 
gridlock in education reform. 
 
6.  Six Policy Episodes: Success, Failure, and Mixed Results in Policymaking 
for Productivity 
 
We have selected six policy reform episodes that have had an impact on productivity through 
efficiency gains or innovation. Our selection is somewhat arbitrary. However, they correspond to 
the kind of policies the WEF identifies as crucial to enhance productivity in a middle-income 
country. Two of the cases correspond to success stories in which reforms were approved and 
implemented: the establishment of the antitrust tribunal and a major civil service reform, both in 
2003. Two selected “unsuccessful” cases are the education reform and a new corporate 
governance scheme, while two mixed cases are related to the royalty to mining firms and an 
innovation in the institutional framework.  
 
6.1 First Successful Reform Episode: Public Administration Management System  
 
In 2003, Chile undertook a crucial move in terms of improving the criteria for selecting senior 
civil servants. That year, a new appointment scheme based on an open competitive and 
meritocratic selection process was put in place. By introducing a significant element of the 
modernization of the state, this reform was expected to be TFP enhancing.  
The old civil servant appointment system: Historically, Chile’s development was led by a 
natural resource-intensive strategy, with entrepreneurship characterized by rent-seeking behavior 
that, as such, was not skilled labor-intensive. This feature forced the State to absorb the excess of 
semi-skilled labor that the educational system was producing. Over time, the public sector 
federations gained strength and concentrated on ensuring lifelong employment for public sector 
workers. The National Federation of Public Sector Workers, ANEF (and similar organizations in 
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security and salary increases. The pressure of the ANEF focused on job stability and salaries 
based on seniority at the expense of performance. Also, the vacancy filling processes in the 
public sector were restricted to existing public sector workers. As such, there was no competitive 
selection process that included both internal and external candidates. Furthermore, the selection 
processes were only open to candidates from the directly lower level.  
In response to these hiring restrictions, and given the requirement for skilled 
professionals in the ministries (which were scarce given the selection process described above), a 
fixed-term hiring system with one-year contracts developed over time. This mechanism 
permitted ministries to hire more skilled professionals. However, ANEF opposed this hiring 
system, alleging that it failed to provide adequate employment conditions for workers. Filling 
public sector vacancies through discretional fixed-term contracts fostered a situation whereby the 
governing political parties put their own people into government jobs. This led to filling public 
sector vacancies with people that did not always have the requisite skills (actually, experts in 
politics not in policies).  
The 2002 corruption scandals: By the end of 2002, a vast corruption scandal erupted. 
The scandal was known as MOP-Gate, because it involved the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) 
and Gate, a private company that provided services to the ministry. The scandal was about cash 
overpayments to certain senior civil servants (including the minister) within the MOP using a 
complex structure of ad hoc contracts with private consultants and funds diverted through public 
universities. The case made evident to the public an old informal practice, namely, to finance the 
incumbent political parties through “budget reserved spending” and other informal mechanisms. 
Besides, it revealed the existence of a strong internal machine appointing a large number of 
senior civil servants based exclusively on political criteria rather than on merit. 
This high-profile corruption case resulted in a political crisis that opened a window of 
opportunity to discuss two major issues. The first was incumbent interventionism. Some 3,500 
civil service positions were reserved for people appointed directly by the Executive (Boeninger, 
2007). This discretionary power led to a large number of appointments based on partisan criteria 
and patronage. Moreover, the government had at its disposal a large amount of “reserved 
expenses” not subject to accountability. The second issue was the relationship between money 
and politics. The abovementioned problem underlies another issue related to political party 
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during election periods. However, they must also fund themselves between elections. One way of 
doing so is by putting their members in public sector positions that allow them to finance their 
political activities. Therefore, party members who have been appointed to public sector jobs are 
more dedicated to politics than to their jobs. Right-wing parties also face a funding problem. In 
their case, business groups provide funding in exchange for legislative favors. All of the above is 
compounded by a low level of supervision of political party spending and funding, and therefore 
impunity is the norm.  
Identifying the relevant actors: Given this situation, President Lagos rapidly brokered an 
agreement with the leader of the opposition, UDI president Pablo Longueira. They announced 
the creation of a special anti-corruption commission headed by the Chilean representative of 
Transparency International. For the opposition, the situation was an opportunity to force state 
reform and modernization. Opposition leaders were open to discussing the political financing 
mechanisms because the modernization of the state involves the financing of political parties 
(Boeninger 2007). This position was publicly supported by SOFOFA in its annual meeting.  
As a result, the government has the initial support for launching formal negotiations with 
the opposition. These negotiations were led by Minister of Interior José Miguel Insulza and 
Finance Minister Nicolás Eyzaguirre, who established a commission with leaders of the four 
Concertación parties and the two Alianza parties. Right-wing think tanks were also involved. In 
fact, a salient feature of this reform was the role played by the most influential independent right-
wing think tank, CEP. Indeed, since the end of the 1990s, CEP has been working on a new 
agenda for modernizing the state. It edited two large academic volumes (2000, 2002) with a 
detailed set of proposals put forth by a wide range of authors, including some government 
officials.  The proposals served as the basis for the negotiations. In January 2003, a political 
agreement between the government and the Alianza was publicly announced as a commitment to 
advance a three-point agenda for state modernization, enhanced transparency and accountability, 
and growth promotion. According to Boeninger (2007), bundling this three-point agenda was a 
way to confront the natural resistance of public servants unions to the introduction of a system of 
meritocratic appointments. 
  The final outcome was a law which created a Senior Public Appointments System. A 
technical and independent civil service appointment council (Consejo para la Alta Dirección 
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candidates for the highest public sector jobs through a competitive and meritocratic selection 
process.  The council presents a short list of three or five candidates to the President for final 
selection. The law was a significant and necessary step in the right direction for avoiding 
corruption and reducing inefficiency. However, it did not cover all public sector vacancies, and 
some public services were explicitly excluded. Some 875 vacancies should be filled in this way, 
while nearly 700 continue to be filled at the exclusive discretion of the president.  
The corruption scandal also produced a sweeping reform of campaign finance. Up to that 
point, the financing of political campaigns was an obscure and opaque process. Candidates 
would not disclose where they obtained the money for the campaigns or how much money was 
spent on campaigns. With the 2003 reforms, the process became more transparency. Spending 
caps were introduced—although there are no enforcement mechanisms and no fines for those 
who violate them—together with public financing for campaigns. Candidates are reimbursed 
money based on the number of votes they received. Thus, candidates have an incentive to 
campaign actively, but a high threshold exists for those who cannot borrow money for the 
campaign and pay later. In addition, a complicated mechanism of public disclosure of private 
contributions was adopted. Small contributions can be made public at the discretion of the 
candidates. Larger contributions must be kept secret (but are known to the contributors, 
candidates and, in theory, to the Electoral Service, the government agency in charge of running 
elections). Very large contributions must be made public. Following implementation of this 
reform, the system has worked much better with respect to public funding but not as well at 
generating transparency with respect to private contributions. At least the issue of campaign 
finance has been squarely put into electoral campaigns and public debates. However, the reforms 
did not affect the internal operations of political parties. Public financing is restricted to 
campaigns and does not cover the daily operations of political parties. Parties need not disclose 
how they raise operating funds. Thus, the system allows for opacity in the financing of political 
parties.  
  The political economy of state reform: Several elements of our model are useful in 
explaining the final outcome of state reform. First, an exogenous shock such as the corruption 
scandals of 2002 made the problem highly visible to the citizens.  This is why the scandals 
resulted in a political crisis. Since the government was forced to recognize the existence of such 
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the crisis opened a window of opportunity.  
Second, at the time of the scandals, a detailed technical proposal of state reform 
(including civil service reform) had already been presented by the influential CEP. More 
importantly, a high level of technical consensus was reached across parties, including some 
leading civil servants from the government who assisted in preparing the document. In a context 
of crisis, this technical consensus, coupled with a proposal ready to be implemented, was a 
precious asset to facilitate coordination among political actors. The CEP proposal was the 
cornerstone of the political reform implemented subsequently. Likewise, it was a useful 
benchmark for disciplining political parties in the negotiations.  Our interviews with a broad 
range of first-line policymakers revealed that senior officials in the Lagos administration met 
regularly with CEP board members well after the corruption scandals. This was a case of 
bargaining among few actors in a repeated game scenario. Additionally, reaching an agreement 
for civil service reform was aided by the fact that the outcomes and degrees of implementation of 
the reform were easily measurable.  
Third, the negotiations between the government and the opposition had several exchange 
currencies to reach an agreement. On the one hand, the opposition had the right to demand a 
reduction in the Executive’s discretion to appoint civil servants as well as a reduction in the 
scope of the use of so-called “reserved expenses.” For its part, the government raised the issue of 
the lack of public funds for financing political parties. It was argued that the right-wing parties 
relied on contributions from large companies and that this financing system was very opaque. 
Given this, both sectors had incentives to negotiate the terms of a final project. Certainly, the 
opposition could have tried a one-shot gain strategy in terms of refusing to negotiate with the 
government and thus expanding the political crisis. This could have resulted in increasing its 
chances of winning in the next elections. However, this strategy is less attractive in a system with 
repeated games and only two actors involved (Concertación and Alianza). Moreover, from a 
long-term perspective, it was in the interest of the opposition to stop government electoral 
intervention.  
The final outcome was mixed. It was an important first step, but many issues remain to be 
resolved. Many but not all senior positions should be appointed by the CADP, and the campaign 
finance reform failed to consider the internal operations of political parties. 
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The enactment  of a new antitrust framework in 2003 was an example of a productivity- 
enhancing reform, since it improved the efficiency of the market. The new institutional 
framework amended substantially the existing regulatory body. Interestingly, the reform did not 
face major opposition when discussed in Congress. As a matter of fact, it took less than one year 
from its presentation until its final enactment into law. The project updated the antitrust 
legislation, which was out of synch with both the new economy and the country’s accelerated 
economic growth. First it created a truly independent framework of prosecution and resolution. 
Previously, both functions were somewhat mixed. Second, it endowed both the Prosecutor’s 
Office (Fiscalía Nacional Económica, FNE) and the Resolution Court (Tribunal de Defensa de 
la Libre Competencia, TDLC) with highly qualified technical members. Third, in the new 
framework, the power to fight against monopolistic behavior was vastly improved, for example, 
by defining some of the standard antitrust practices as well as by significantly increasing the 
fines in order to dissuade such practices. 
The old antitrust framework: As part of an economic program to roll back the planned 
economy and its state-owned companies inherited from the previous government, in 1973, the 
Pinochet dictatorship passed a law creating a tripartite institutional antitrust body. It was 
composed of a National Economic Prosecutor Office (Fiscalía Nacional Económica, FNE), a 
special antitrust tribunal (the Antitrust Commission), and a number of regional advisory 
Preventive Commissions in charge of ex-ante consultations on antitrust matters.  The FNE was a 
lawyer appointed by the president. His office was in charge of investigating and enforcing 
findings on cases related to antitrust controversies. In principle, the FNE office was independent. 
However, its budget and its supervision were dependent on the Ministry of Economy.   
Until 1999, the FNE did not experience any significant change. That year, a law was 
passed which strengthened its powers, doubled its human resources up to 60 people, and raised 
their salaries.  In 2001, the Prosecutor, Pedro Mattar, a well-respected lawyer who served as 
member of the Antitrust Commission (1994–1996), reorganized the office into three main 
enforcement departments, a Legal Department responsible for conducting investigations, an 
Economic Department acting as advisor for legal department during the investigations, and a 
Regulated Markets and Technical Analysis Department.   
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Preventive Commissions (Comisiones Preventivas).  These were regional consultative organs in 
charge of answering questions (ex ante) dealing with activities that could restrict competition. 
There were 11 Regional Preventive Commissions and a Central Preventive Commission for 
Santiago and other cases involving more than one region. The Central Commission was 
composed of a representative from the Ministry of the Economy, a representative from the 
Ministry of Finance, two university professors, and a representative from the Neighborhood 
Associations. Commission members did not receive any pay. 
The third body of the antitrust framework was the Antitrust Commission (Comisión 
Resolutiva). The Commission was a special court whose main function was to decide cases 
brought by either the FNE or private complainants. It applied sanctions, including fines, penal 
duties, and business dissolution and restructuring.  The antitrust body was under the supervision 
of the Supreme Court and was chaired by a judge appointed by the Court. The remaining 
members were two Chiefs of Service from the Economy and Treasury Ministries and two 
representatives from the universities (deans of the Economics and Law Departments). As in the 
case of the Preventive Commissions, the members of the Antitrust Commission did not receive 
any pay. Indeed, none of these Commissions had a budget.  Moreover, while they were supposed 
to be independent from the Prosecutor’s Office, both of them relied upon a Prosecutor’s Office 
Secretariat, which provided them technical and administrative assistance.  
The new framework: None of the tripartite antitrust bodies were fully independent. On the 
one hand, the Executive appointed their members. On the other, the Preventive and Antitrust 
commissions relied on the Prosecutor’s Office. This was a serious shortcoming, potentially 
hampering the necessary impartiality required for efficient performance of the antitrust body. In 
addition, both the Preventive and Antitrust Commissions relied on unpaid members whose 
technical skills for solving antitrust controversies were far from adequate. Finally, the antitrust 
framework had not been updated for 30 years. In 2003, a new law (#19.911) passed to reform the 
framework accomplished two goals: it strengthened the antitrust policies and it replaced the 
Antitrust and Preventive Commissions with a new independent and technically based Antitrust 
Tribunal (Tribunal de la Libre Competencia, TDLC).  
Main actors involved: As confirmed to us by inside actors, the UDI president, Senator 
Jovino Novoa, was the leading voice of the Alianza during the debates.  Novoa was advised by 
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including Axel Buchheister, an expert in constitutional and legal issues, and María de la Luz 
Domper, a senior economist and an expert in antitrust matters. According to our interviews, the 
advising process was so meticulous that Novoa’s team “reviewed word for word every single 
sentence proposed by the government during the informal negotiations.”  
The FNE was represented by its director, Pedro Mattar, its deputy director, Enrique 
Vergara—who currently serves as the National Prosecutor—and its technical staff. According to 
interviews, a significant part of the informal negotiations between the opposition and the 
government were carried out at the FNE headquarters. On the government side, the negotiators 
were the Minister of Economy, Jorge Rodríguez, a member of the PDC, and the Vice-Minister 
Alvaro Díaz, a socialist, with the support of his technical and legal staff. The Senate Economy 
and Finance Commissions comprised senators representing all parties. Several business 
organizations were also active in the debate and discussions. During Senate commission debates, 
SOFOFA was represented by its legal counsel, Claudio Undurraga, while CPC was represented 
by its CEO, Carlos Urenda. SNA was represented by its General Secretary, Jorge Garcia. Finally, 
the Comisión Defensora Ciudadana, with its president, Francisco Fernández, a member of the 
Socialist Party, represented the interests of consumers and citizens. 
Critical issues and objections to the project: The former government project was 
unanimously supported by the two right-wing parties as well as by representatives of the 
business sector. However, several critical issues were raised. Most of the legislative debate 
occurring in 2002-2003 centered on these issues. From our review of the legislative debates as 
well as from interviews with representatives of LyD, we identified eight main controversies.  
First, the judicial goal to be protected (Article 1 of the Law). The former government 
project intended simultaneously to protect competition, consumers, and the efficiency of the 
market. This was opposed by actors close to right-wing parties, particularly in relation to 
consumer protection. It was argued that defining multiple goals could be misleading and 
discretionary and that consumer protection should be the subject of a different law. This 
opposition was supported by LyD (Informe Económico 133, October 2002), RN, and UDI, and 
the business organizations CPC and SNA. On the other side, the Comisión Defensora Ciudadana 
supported the principle of defending consumers’ interests. In the law passed in 2003, the 
tripartite goal was abandoned. Instead, the law favored a somewhat vague objective, namely, 
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that matter, defining free competition. This ambiguity has been recognized as a problem by some 
of the members of the TDLC. 
Second, the real independence of the TDLC (Art 8). The former project stated that the 
PDLC would be composed of five members with three-year terms elected as follows: one 
Supreme Court justice elected by the Supreme Court; one economist and one lawyer with 
relevant experience in antitrust matters appointed by the ministers of Economy and Finance, 
respectively; two scholars (one economist and one lawyer) selected by the Consejo de Rectores, 
an organization comprising all traditional public and private universities. CPC, SOFOFA, LyD 
and the two right-wing parties argued that this formula did not grant the TDLC independence 
from the President. In the same fashion, LyD and SNA criticized the short term in office (three 
years) of the members of the Tribunal. 
The final agreement reached was as follows: the president of the Tribunal, a lawyer with 
at least ten years of experience in competition law, would be appointed by the President from a 
list of five nominees supplied by the Supreme Court after a public competition open to all 
interested qualified candidates. The other members (two lawyers and two economists) would be 
appointed as follows: one lawyer and one economist chosen by the President from a list of three 
nominees submitted by the Council of Governors of the Central Bank and selected through a 
public competition, and the other lawyer and economist would be appointed directly by the 
Central Bank from candidates selected by the same open and public competition process. The 
appointed members serve six-year terms and may be reappointed.  Tribunal members receive a 
fixed salary plus a fee based on the amount of work done. The Tribunal must meet at least twice 
per week. The TDLC has his own budget and staff. The opposition won this battle, as the 
Executive agreed to limit its influence over the process of appointing Tribunal members. 
Third, the excessive amount of fines (article 17). The former project eliminated the penal 
sanctions for antitrust practices (a provision not invoked since 1973). This modification was 
broadly accepted by all social actors. However, the draft bill sent by the President had initially 
proposed to heavily increase fines levied by the Tribunal from a maximum of nearly $230,000 up 
to $15,300,000 (30,000 Unidades Tribunales Mensuales, UTM, some US$1.5 million). In 
addition, these fines could be issued against a company or its board of directors and management 
staff. This point was opposed by SOFOFA, CPC, and SNA, as well as by RN, UDI and LyD. 
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caused.  The opponents also criticized the fact that the fines would be added to the Tribunal’s 
budget rather than distributed among the economic actors affected. In addition, they disagreed 
with the criteria of extending the fines to management and the board of directors.  
The Lagos administration reckoned that the fines should be sufficiently high to be 
dissuasive. Moreover, the gravity of the crime had to be sanctioned regardless of the economic 
damages involved. In the law enacted in 2003, the maximum fine was set at $10,200,000 (20,000 
UTM). However, the provision according to which both the management and board of directors 
could eventually be sanctioned was retained. All in all, the opposition obtained a point and the 
government kept a relevant part of its original proposition. 
Fourth, defined examples of antitrust practices (Art 3). The former project explicitly 
described three antitrust practices to be sanctioned: explicit or tacit agreements (collusion) on 
prices, quantities, or market shares; the abusive exploitation of a dominant market position, and 
predatory practices designed to increase or reach a dominant market position. The UDI, 
represented by Senator Novoa, was contrary to such a “vast and vague” definition
3 of the type of 
antitrust conduct included in the original Article 3. The argument was that these definitions could 
be misleading since they were not necessarily the manifestation of antitrust practices. Not 
surprisingly, this was the same argument made by the economist and legal experts from LyD 
(LyD, “Informe Económico #133”, October, 2002). The law enacted in 2003 kept these three 
examples of antitrust behavior and introduced some very minor changes. Thus, the Alianza 
opposition did not obtain the change that it was demanding. 
Fifth, strengthening the powers of the Prosecutor. Aside from the changes introduced in 
1999, the project gave new powers to the National Economic Prosecutor, including the authority 
to sign agreements with domestic agencies and foreign entities, the right to take depositions from 
judicial and natural persons, asking other public entities “secret” information relevant to the 
investigation. Both the SOFOFA and the SNA opposed these changes. However, in the end, the 
previous clauses were retained in the final Law of 2003.  
Sixth, the independence of the Prosecutor. CPC, LyD and right-wing parties advocated 
for a designation mechanism that would grant the independence of the Prosecutor. The initial 
                                                           
3 See Jovino Novoa intervention at the Senate on September 3
rd, 2002. In Historia de le Ley 19911, pp. 2592-2594. 
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end, no changes occurred and the previous clauses were kept in the law enacted in 2003.  
Seventh, the advisory role of the TDLC. There were disagreements on granting the 
TDLC an advisory role. It was argued that the TDLC should solely serve as a dispute-resolution 
institution. That position was supported by SOFOFA and SNA. In addition, LyD was contrary to 
the idea of dissolving the preventive commissions that existed in the previous framework. None 
of these objections was finally incorporated in the law. 
Eight, imposing costs on the claimant in case of absolution. SOFOFA and LyD claimed 
that, in case of absolution, any natural or judicial person that accused a company of antitrust 
practices should be required to pay compensation or a fine. The argument was that this was 
necessary to avoid the presentation of antitrust suits that lacked merit. In the end, the law enacted 
in 2003 did not include this idea.  
Summing up, some interesting observations can be made. First, the general idea of the 
project proposed by the Lagos administration to create a new Antitrust Commission (TDLC) was 
broadly and rapidly accepted by the opposition and business associations. Yet, there were 
discrepancies and differences related to specific articles of the proposed bill. Second, the 
criticism and objections raised by Alianza parties, primarily UDI, were roughly the same as those 
raised by business associations. In many aspects, UDI and the business associations acted as a 
single block. This interesting observation was especially true in the case of the three more 
problematic points raised by opposition parties: the judicial good to be protected, the 
independence of the TDLC, and the size of the fines. Interviews with right-wing actors (both 
from the political parties and the think tank LyD) who directly participated in the process 
confirmed that these were the three most important issues for them.  
On these three points, opposition parties extracted important concessions from the Lagos 
administration in the final law enacted. However, their remaining observations (points 4 to 8 of 
the above list) were not truly taken into account in the final law. It is as if the opposition parties 
were willing to sacrifice points 4 to 8 in exchange for the government’s concessions on the first 
three aforementioned provisions. 
The political economy of competition policy: From a PMP perspective, three elements of 
this model are in play. First, the existence of a reduced number of actors coupled with, second, 
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visibility but high impact to some relevant vested interests.   
The final law was the achievement of a continuous policymaking process that started in 
1999 and involved a reduced number of actors. At that time, Law #19.610 was enacted, 
increasing the powers and responsibilities of the Prosecutor’s Office (FNE) in antitrust matters. 
Since then, the government and the opposition agreed on the creation of a technical commission 
to reach consensus around the creation of an independent antitrust body, which finally resulted in 
the TDLC. From a technical perspective, the negotiations were mainly carried out by the LyD, 
the Ministry of Economy and its technical and legal staff, and the Prosecutor’s Office and its 
technical and legal staff. In the words of the Minister of Economy, Jorge Rodríguez, the project 
was “the natural outcome of the process started with Law 19.610.”
4 This explains why the 
reform did not face major opposition in Congress. It took only slightly more than one year from 
the government’s former proposal until its final enactment as law in 2003. Opposition parties 
immediately approved the first version of the draft presented in 2002 in its general aspects. The 
legislative discussion carried out in two commissions of the Senate (Economy and Finance 
Commissions) was mostly focused on the specific article points that we have reviewed.   
In our PMP model, visibility is a crucial condition for successful outcomes. Yet, 
reforming the antitrust institutions had low visibility. It was not preceded by an emblematic case 
or a public scandal. It involved a technical discussion far away from the public interest. The 
project was quite relevant for vested interests in the right-wing coalition, large economic groups.  
In principle, a reform strengthening the power of the antitrust body could be seen as 
hampering the particular interests of major economic groups. Thus, one would expect the right 
wing to oppose such an initiative. As seen, this was far from being the case. Not only was the 
former project largely accepted in general terms, but also its final approval in Congress was 
extremely expedient. How can we explain this success story? 
The initial equilibrium was bad for both the opposition parties and the business 
associations. Thus, there was a large win set for reaching agreements with the government, 
because the National Prosecutor’s powers were increased in 1999.
5 This made it necessary to 
counteract such a power by granting the independence of the Resolution Body (TDLC). This 
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5 Our interview with first hand actors from LyD reveals that this theoretical point was indeed the main reason for 
supporting the project.  
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their claims for more independence in the selection of the members of the TDLC. As previously 
seen, this was a battle they won.  
In the same fashion, although agreeing with the elimination of the penal sanctions, the 
opposition parties and the business sectors were against the “very high” fines established in the 
former project. However, in the end, they obtained a reduction in these maximum fines. They 
were also successful in excluding consumer protection from the first article of the project. 
Instead, the law defined a very broad goal. Because of this opacity, one could argue that the final 
outcome favored the companies. 
An alternative way to see this is an information approach. Since 1999, the benefits from 
such a reform were visible for anybody, independent of their ideology. This is probably the 
reason why after this event, the government, the Prosecutor and LyD began a negotiating process 
on reforming the TDLC. The “bad” initial equilibrium was the catalyst for ending an 
asymmetrical situation that had blocked the reform. In the past, although there was agreement 
that the project could be socially beneficial, the benefits to the right-wing parties and the 
companies were not sufficiently clear. The Chilean antitrust scheme relied on a framework that, 
despite its evident imperfections, did not truly affect the economic interest of the business class. 
It was in the interest of the right-wing parties “to exchange” more regulation for “less 
discretionary power.” This is why everybody declared their general agreement with the former 
government’s idea. What followed was to pursue negotiations, step by step, on the most relevant 
articles we have already described. 
 
6.3 First Unsuccessful Policy Episode: Education Reform 
 
The quality of the educational system became a central issue in the policy debate at the 
beginning of the Lagos administration. During the 1990s, the main education policy challenge 
was to increase coverage for high school and tertiary education. By the end of the decade, that 
goal was mostly attained, refocusing national attention on the poor performance of Chilean 
students on international educational attainment tests (PISA and TIMSS) and on the overall 
quality of the education system. Indeed, Chile lags behind in terms of its scores in international 
standardized tests, even after controlling for its GDP per capita. In tests such as PISA or 
TIMMS, Chile’s scores are about one standard deviation below what is expected in countries 
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Report in 2008, Chile ranked 86
th, 106
th and 110
th out of 134 countries in terms of the perceived 
“quality of “the educational system,” “math and science” and “quality of public schools,” 
respectively. This situation contrasts sharply with Chile’s good overall Global Competitiveness 
Position (28
th).  
By contrast, in 2000, Chile ranked 43
rd and 47
th in terms of the two first aforementioned 
indicators. The policies needed to increase quality were highly technical, involving better 
regulations, supervision, and accountability, better teacher training, and higher public spending. 
These policies affect myriad private interests and have high ideological connotations. 
The educational system and the main policy reforms since 1990: The educational system 
is based on vouchers as a mechanism for financing both municipal and private, subsidized 
schools. The objective was to generate competition within the system and increase the ability of 
parents to match their preferences for specific values or pedagogical approaches to schooling. 
The system has three types of providers: municipal—public—education (45 percent of all 
students), a private subsidized system (48 percent) and pure private schools (7 percent). Both 
municipal and private subsidized schools receive a per-student subsidy of about US$70 per 
month.  
The management of municipal schools depends on each municipality.  Municipal mayors 
do not have authority over hiring, firing, and setting teacher salaries and contracts. While public 
elementary schools are free by law, if the school community agrees, the municipal high schools 
can levy “voluntary fees,” although in practice, only about 15 percent do this. Private entities run 
subsidized schools. These include foundations, religious organizations, individual entrepreneurs, 
and companies known as “sostenedores.” Aside from the per student state subsidy (voucher), 
they can charge an extra fee. About 50 percent of private voucher schools remain free, and most 
schools charge only minimal fees, called financiamiento compartido (Cox, 2004). 
When democracy was restored in 1990, the government faced a number of challenges. 
The incoming center-left government acquiesced to deadlock constitutional provisions left in 
place by the outgoing regime (Boeninger, 1997; Zaldívar Larraín, 1995). In addition, three days 
prior to the end of the military regime, Pinochet passed laws that required supermajorities in 
order to pass reforms. Among those last-minute laws, the Organic Constitutional Law of 
Education (LOCE) constrained the new government’s ability to alter the educational model and 
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the outgoing regime’s imposed educational model and the new government’s tied hands to tear 
down the “neoliberal” economic model. Among the reforms deadlocked by the LOCE was the 
school voucher system. More importantly, the LOCE required the state to ensure access to 
education but did not give it the responsibility to ensure that everyone received a high-quality 
education. 
During the Aylwin administration, the government worked with teachers’ unions to 
strengthen job security. The Estatuto Docente (Teachers’ Statute) defining employment 
immobility was hailed as a reform that gave justice to teachers, a group whose opposition to 
Pinochet cost them dearly in salaries and job security. Two problems—voucher schools 
oversight and teacher accountability—became the issues over which all educational debates were 
fought in subsequent years. On the one hand, the Concertación regularly attributed the deficient 
educational results to the lack of government oversight power over privately run schools. On the 
other, the opposition blamed the Concertación for not adopting mechanisms to increase teacher 
accountability. The voucher system was partially modified under Aylwin. The Ley de 
Financiamiento Compartido (Shared Financing, in 1993) allowed voucher schools to charge fees 
to complement the government subsidy. That reform, heralded as an opportunity to improve the 
quality of the education received by children, helped worsen the already unequal access to 
education.   
The second Concertación administration (Eduardo Frei, 1994-2000) focused on reforms 
designed to expand coverage, improve infrastructure, and provide parents with school 
performance information. Although tests had been administered since the mid 1980s, the results 
were only made public after 1990. At first, results were tabulated by cities rather than by schools. 
Thus, parents had limited information on the quality of the education their children received. The 
full-day school reform (Jornada Escolar Completa) became a symbol of the Frei’s approach to 
educational reform. Rather than take on the vested interests of teachers’ unions or voucher 
school owners (“sostenedores”), Frei implemented reforms that increased educational spending 
but failed to improve accountability. National test scores began to show that increased spending 
had failed to improve performance.  
The third Concertación administration (Lagos, 2000-2006) introduced reforms to 
improve teacher accountability through a voluntary teacher evaluation program tied to salary 
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the reluctant support such initiatives found among Concertación legislators. The government 
failed to push legislation to strengthen its oversight power over private voucher schools. Reform 
initiatives were blocked by Concertación legislators who opposed introducing more 
accountability tools to improve teacher quality and by Alianza legislators who opposed a 
stronger regulatory framework. Because reforms required supermajorities, the government opted 
to improve access to information, introduce better quality measurements, and increase funding 
for infrastructure, salaries, and subsidies to needy communities.   
Shortly after taking office, the fourth Concertación administration (Michelle Bachelet, 
2006-2010) was hit by a surprise national secondary student protest. The students opposed 
unequal access to education. Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, voucher schools had 
grown from 32 percent of all students in 1990 to more than 40 percent in 2005 (Brunner et al., 
2006).  
As a response to the protests, in June of 2006, Bachelet appointed an 83-member 
Educational Quality Advisory Council and charged it with proposing a comprehensive education 
reform to improve quality and reduce unequal access. The advisory council issued a non-
unanimous report in December 2006. Contentious issues divided council members along 
ideological lines. While the majority of council members—sympathetic to student demands—
favored a requirement that would prohibit voucher schools from discretional selection of students 
(a practice that allowed rejection of high-risk students), a minority of members sought to 
promote competition among educational providers. The workings of the council are invaluable as 
a laboratory for understanding the main issues and ideological positions of the various political 
and social actors involved in the reform.   
Relevant Actors and Issues of the Chilean Educational PMP: In December 2006, the 
Council produced a large policy document with an assessment and recommendations.
6 Because 
the Commission was composed of 83 individuals from across the political, institutional, and 
technical spectrum, it represents a good sample of the main social actors involved in the 
educational debate, their ideological and technical positions, and their points of agreement and 
divergence as well as their main arguments. 
 
                                                           
6 The 252-page document is available at : http://www.consejoeducacion.cl/articulos/Informefinal.pdf 
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Constituencies represented  Number of members   percent Total membership 
Congress and government officials  4  4.8 
University representatives  16  19.3 
Private school representatives  4  4.8 
Teachers representatives  6  7.2 
Student representatives  16  19.3 
Think tanks  7  8.4 
Municipalities 7  8.4 
High school students  13  15.7 
Church 3  3.6 
Other 7  8.4 
TOTAL 83  100 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Think tanks: There were four think tanks represented on the Council. LyD exerted a 
strong influence on right-wing legislators. CEP, the influential liberal technical right-wing think 
tank, has formal independence from the two conservative political parties. Partially funded by 
the Matte family, one of the richest in the country, CEP is generally perceived as advocating for 
the interest of the market-friendly entrepreneurial class. Expansiva is a liberal and highly 
technocratic left-of-center think tank founded by Andrés Velasco, the current Finance Minister. 
Its views are mostly influential within the Concertación, but somewhat unpopular among left-
wing legislators. The Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo (CENDA) is a 
less influential leftist ideological think tank, but its views are popular among student 
representatives and also among some left-wing Concertación legislators. 
Teachers Unions: The Colegio de Profesores represented the interests of teachers. 
Composed of teachers from the (public) municipal school system and politically close to the 
Socialist Party in the Concertación and the PC, The Colegio de Profesores favors a fully public 
schools approach and opposes voucher schools. It also defends the Estatuto Docente, which 
grants tenure to public school teachers and determines salaries based on seniority  rather than 
performance. Teachers were also represented by the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT). 
Though not directly concerned with education, CUT espoused views  sympathetic to those of the 
Colegio de Profesores. CUT is politically close to the PS and PC. The Asociación Nacional de 
Empleados Fiscales (ANEF) is a strong union of public sector employees. Not directly 
concerned with educational topics, ANEF supports the views of the Colegio de Profesores and 
CUT and has a representative on the Council as well.  
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schools. The Matte Schools were represented by Patricia Matte, a member of the wealthy family 
that runs the schools (and funds CEP). Matte is also a leading educational advisor for LyD. Matte 
schools are a successful nonprofit voucher school group. In a sense, Matte Schools represented a 
large number of private voucher (subsidized) schools. They advocate for school freedom to 
define their educational programs and to select their students. Because of their good educational 
results, Matte Schools are a standard bearer for those who argue that bad educational 
performance of schools has more to do with poor management than with a lack of financial 
resources.  
Critics maintain that Matte Schools and other quality voucher school can show better 
results precisely because they select the best students from among the group of low- income 
family students that have no choice but to attend public schools or voucher schools that do not 
charge an additional fee.   In fact, critics contend that the presence of Matte Schools and other 
well-ran private schools worsens the already difficult situation of municipal schools in poor 
neighborhoods, since most good students are recruited by these private nonprofit schools, leaving 
the poorer-performing students behind in municipal schools.  
Student federations:  Students were also represented on the Council. Divided into 
secondary and higher education students, the unions gained recognition after the “Penguin 
Revolution” of 2006. Among these unions are the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile 
(CONFECH), the Confederación de Estudiantes de la Educación Superior Privada 
(CONFESUP) and the Asamblea de Estudiantes Secundarios (ACES). In general, student unions 
claimed the political credit for the initiative to reform the educational system. They advocated in 
favor of more equal access to education and equated their demands with the abolition of the 
LOCE law.  
Scholars: A number of scholars also sat on the Council. We do not aggregate them in a 
single body, since they are generally associated with think tanks or universities. They were 
invited for their technical expertise. Interestingly, most of the influential Chilean scholars on 
educational policy are economists.  
Universities:  Representatives from universities were also convened on the Council. 
Universities can be classified as belonging to the Consejo de Rectores, and thus recipients of 
direct public financing (Aporte Fiscal Directo, AFI) and private universities created after 1981 
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sympathetic with state intervention in the educational system while the latter endorse 
competition in the educational system.  
Political parties: Because of the binominal electoral system, most parties are grouped 
into two coalitions with parliamentary representation, the center-right Alianza and the center-left 
Concertación. The two other left-wing parties with no parliamentary representation are the PC 
and PH. Within the Alianza, the largest is UDI, while RN is closer to the center. In the 
Concertación, aligned in a center-left continuum, are PDC, the largest, PRSD, PPD and PS. 
Ideological positions on key issues: According to the Report of the Education Council, 
there was a relatively shared assessment on the bad quality of the educational system and on 
unequal access.  There was also a common view on the need to increase public funds, but not on 
how such funds should be allocated. Positions diverged on the role of the private sector in the 
educational system and competition as quality enhancing. Consequently, positions were in 
conflict on some key ideological issues.  
State provision of public education: Some sectors claimed that public education means 
that the state provides it. Moreover, they argued that public provision is better than private 
provision. Teachers unions, student unions, public university representatives and left-wing 
parties overwhelmingly favored these views. We shall call them pro public-run education. Others 
argued that the system should be mixed, that public (municipal) schools should co-exist and 
compete with private subsidized schools. The role of the state should be in financing, but not 
necessarily in providing education. Think tanks, right-wing parties, private schools, and private 
university representatives favored these views. We will refer to them as the pro public-financed 
group. Scholars were divided between both groups.  
For-profit schools: The first group claimed that private schools could only exist if they 
were nonprofit. The second group, the pro public-financed group, argued that for-profit schools 
are inherent in a competitive efficiency-enhancing market. In between, there emerged the view 
that schools could be for profit as long as they did not receive public funding.   
Freedom to choose programs: The first group argued in favor of a common curriculum 
for private (subsidized) and public schools. The second group argued against on the grounds that 
it would violate the right of parents, and schools, to select educational priorities.  
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quality agency. Vouchers should be conditional on the fulfillment of minimum quality standards. 
Opponents of this view claimed that creating such a public agency would run the risk of ruling 
against the freedom to select educational curricula. They opposed the standardization and 
centralization of the curriculum.   
Student selection:  The first group argued in favor of prohibiting public and private 
voucher schools from selecting students. Schools that received government funds would be 
banned from selecting students. They would be required to implement blind admission policies. 
Opponents claimed that blind selection would limit freedom for religious schools that would 
normally prefer to admit students whose parents shared the school’s religious affiliation.  
Table 4 presents a simplified description of the positions of some of the relevant actors 
previously identified in terms of the aforementioned ideological issues. 
 
Table 4. Ideological Positions on Educational Reform in Bachelet’s Advisory Council, 2006 





Colegio de Profesores, UT  
PS, Student Unions 
Public universities 
Part of the 
Concertación 
Right wing (UDI, RN), Part of 
Concertación, Private schools (Matte 
schools) 




Colegio de Profesores 
CUT, Student Unions 
Part of the Concertación  
Part of the 
Concertación,  some 
scholars, some 
universities  
Right wing (UDI, RN), Private schools 





Colegio de Profesores, CUT, 
Students Unions, part of the 
Concertación 
Some scholars,   Right wing parties (UDI, RN), Private 
schools representatives (Matte schools), 
some scholars, LyD, CEP,Expansiva 
Quality 
agency 
Rightwing parties (UDI) 
Private schools (Matte 
schools), Libertad y 
Desarrollo 
Renovación Nacional 
Centro de Estudios 
Públicos 
Colegio de Profesores, CUT 
Students Unions, most of the 
Concertación, most scholars 
Freedom to 
select students 
Colegio de Profesores, CUT, 
Students Unions, most of the 
Concertación, some scholars 
Some scholars  Right-wing parties (UDI, RN) 
Private schools (Matte schools) 
Some scholars, LyD, CEP 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
  49The political economy of education reform: Because the Council had more members 
inclined to support publicly administered—rather than publicly financed—education, the final 
report reflected those views. In addition, because the student unions that had triggered the 
protests that eventually forced the government to form the Council were vocally in favor of the 
pro-publicly administered view, the final report reflected that vision.  
President Bachelet sent legislation to Congress in early 2007 to replace the LOCE. The 
proposed legislation included eliminating for-profit voucher schools (voucher schools run by 
religious organizations and non-profits would still be allowed), the strengthening of public 
schools and the banning of discretionary selection. Although the proposal was rejected by the 
Alianza—because it went after sostenedores but not teachers—a compromise was brokered 
between the government and the opposition. Yet, the legislation was far from a done deal. 
Concertación legislators rebelled against the agreement. When Bachelet made concessions to 
them, the Alianza disavowed the agreement. The legislation has been stalled in Congress since.   
An unrelated corruption scandal in early 2008—associated with lack of oversight of 
voucher payments to privately run schools in Santiago—diverted attention from the debate over 
the new legislation. The Senate impeached the Minister of Education—appointed after the 
previous minister was sacked amid the student protests in 2006. Although a new Minister was 
appointed—the third under Bachelet—there was little room for negotiation, and the 
comprehensive reform was frozen in Congress using procedural tactics.  The tension between a 
government coalition that sought a reform to undermine voucher schools while protecting 
teachers’ unions, and the opposition with the exact opposite interests, has effectively blocked 
reform. The progress made since 1990 has been achieved without undermining the power of 
teachers and sostenedores. Although some progress was made in educational coverage, 
infrastructure and teachers’ salaries in the first three Concertación administrations, there seems 
to be no more room for improvement unless the reforms affect the vested interests of the two 
most powerful groups involved in the education sector—private school owners and teachers.   
Since democracy was restored, the average tenure of a Minister of Education has been 
one and a half years, the shortest of any ministry. The constant change in leadership has 
undermined the government’s ability to push through its agenda and has strengthened the 
influence of vested interests and their lobbying capacity with political parties represented in 
Congress.  
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government-sponsored reforms. Private for-profit owners interested in limiting government 
oversight have teamed up with not-for-profit religious schools interested in maintaining 
discretionary selective mechanisms in favor of families that share their religious values. Non-
profit educational institutions also favor selection mechanisms, for they can promote their 
educational vision and discriminate in favor of students and parents who share their educational 
objectives. As a result, private voucher schools have formed a cohesive group that opposes 
Concertación governments’ efforts to strengthen the regulatory framework, increase government 
oversight, and limit discretionary selection.  
The Colegio de Profesores has blocked the government’s efforts to introduce stronger 
quality control mechanisms. After years of negotiation, the government introduced a voluntary 
self-assessment evaluation for teachers. Although there were salary incentives associated with 
participating in the self-assessment, its implementation failed since there were practically no 
costs for those teachers who failed the self-assessment evaluation.  
Because the components of the educational reform debate are opaque and confusing to 
public opinion, vested interest can more effectively block the government’s effort to bring about 
reform. Parents are interested in quality education, but they are not well informed as to what 
constitutes quality education and how it can be achieved. Public opinion polls regularly show 
that parents are aware that the quality of education received in average by Chilean children is not 
good. But they also think their children are getting good education at their schools. If parents 
cannot easily assess the quality of the education they receive, the opaqueness of the educational 
debate makes it difficult for the government to make its case in favor of a sensible reform.  
Conversely, when the problem is more transparent—that is, when the cause of the 
problem is more easily identified—the government can move a reform forward more easily. The 
students’ protests of 2006 showed that Chileans backed a comprehensive reform. When students 
protested, public opinion strongly supported the notion that something had to be done to improve 
the quality of education. Yet, when details were discussed, there was no agreement as to what 
was best. To be sure, some minor yet significant reforms have been implemented since 2006. 
The government was able to secure congressional support for a legislation that gave a bigger 
voucher to schools serving students from the poorest quintile of the population. Thus, a school 
located in a poor neighborhood would get more money per student than a school in a middle or 
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unequal access to education and to provide incentives for private voucher schools to seek out 
students from low-income families. That reform also indirectly increased funding for municipal 
public schools that primarily serve low-income students.   
That reform was passed because it benefited different constituencies and did not directly 
hinder any powerful constituency. Yet, other reforms proposed have been blocked by powerful 
constituencies. The end of selection in voucher schools has been blocked by a coalition led by 
for-profit voucher schools. The end of selection would reduce discrimination against at-risk 
children (who are more challenging to educate as they come from dysfunctional or poor families, 
crime-ridden neighborhoods, etc). But it will not induce competition among schools nor will it 
create incentives for schools to provide better education. Yet, the end of selection is championed 
by left-wing Concertación parties who are ideologically opposed to privately run schools and 
would much rather prefer an all-public school system.     
Similarly, the government’s proposal to end for-profit schools responds to the growing 
influence of left-wing parties within the Concertación—especially during the Bachelet 
administration. Yet, that reform has been blocked by the Alianza, whose ideological position 
makes it favor private enterprise and oppose state-run initiatives. Teachers’ unions favor the 
elimination of for-profit schools because for-profit school owners optimize their earning by 
reducing costs (teachers’ salaries). Yet, for-profit school owners reckon that teachers are only 
concerned with their salaries but oppose any form of control over the quality of their teaching. 
Naturally, quality control is more efficient when conducted by for-profit voucher school owners.   
As a result, the Bachelet administration has found it impossible to deliver on its promise 
of introducing a comprehensive educational reform. After previous governments reached the 
limit in adopting reforms that did not challenge the vested interests of teachers and voucher 
school owners, the Bachelet administration found it impossible to advance a reform that could 
undermine the power and influence of either the teachers’ union or the voucher schools owners.  
 
6.4 The Second Unsuccessful Policy Reform: Corporate Governance Reform  
 
Protection of minority shareholders’ rights became a concern for policymakers by the early 
2000s as a potential restriction for capital market development, therefore limiting future 
productivity gains. A survey by Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez (June 2008) revealed that three out 
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market. We discuss below the failed effort championed by the Lagos administration in 2002 to 
bring about corporate governance reform. The reform submitted to Congress by the Lagos 
administration did not capture public and media attention, but it did negatively affect powerful 
private interests that vigorously opposed it. Left-wing political parties did not feel the need to 
defend the proposed reform (and use their political capital) as their electoral base did not 
perceive it as affecting their interests. Despite the significant positive effect of the bill over the 
large majority of shareholders, the right-wing opposition coalition, strongly lobbied by powerful 
economic interests, was able to publicly portray the reform as unnecessary red tape, killing the 
reform without paying any political price. 
The development of deep capital markets is a key element for enhancing productivity in 
an economy. Deep capital markets allow for the savings of risk-averse households to flow into 
risky, innovative projects with large potential upsides in terms of productivity gains. By contrast, 
when capital markets are thin, investors are left with limited options to finance their projects. In 
less developed capital markets, those options are usually restricted to the firms’ own funds or 
traditional bank lending. Firms are generally reluctant to finance risky projects with their own 
funds because they are not able to hedge the associated risks. Similarly, banks are reluctant to 
take on too much risk in their portfolios given their need to safeguard the value of their assets to 
honor their liabilities with depositors. However, as capital markets get deeper, a number of other 
financial intermediaries and products develop, allowing for the risk to be diversified across a 
larger number of agents and markets. In turn, this deepening widens the financing options 
available to the more innovative projects. 
A number of institutional features lie behind the depth of capital markets. Perhaps the 
more salient are the rate of economic growth, its stability, and the protection of property rights. 
In the latter domain, one aspect of particular importance is the regulatory framework for 
corporate governance and its enforcement. Corporations that seek financing through public 
offerings present a complex property structure that makes it possible, in the absence of an 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework, for some shareholders and/or managers to 
benefit at the expense of other shareholders without their consent or knowledge. When such 
events occur, the development of capital markets becomes seriously impaired or even suffers 
severe setbacks. 
  53Corporate governance was not an important priority of public policy in Chile after 1990. 
Initially, the debate was dominated by the controversy over the privatization of public enterprises 
during the authoritarian regime. However, since a legal agreement was reached during the 
transition between the democratic leaders and the representatives of the old regime, an agreement 
that forbid revisiting those privatizations, the debate finally abated. But in the second half of the 
1990s, a number of takeovers took place in the corporate sector, including in a few former public 
entities. Some of those takeovers caused a public scandal because minority shareholders 
denounced rent extraction. As the problems created by an inadequate regulatory framework for 
corporate governance have become apparent to the general public, the issue has been consistently 
in the public debate, and a number of legal initiatives have been discussed. 
Chile has a quite deep and developed capital market. In relation to its GDP, market 
capitalization is far above the ratios exhibited by other Latin American countries. But given the 
relative small size of the Chilean economy, the absolute level of market capitalization is still 
limited and can potentially grow substantially more, as can be inferred from the ratios achieved 
by other small to medium-sized developed economies. That achievement would be highly 
desirable to foster productivity. But to understand why such a sophisticated and technical topic, 
even considering its importance for economic growth, has sometimes acquired a high level of 
visibility, it is important to bear in mind two features of the Chilean economy. The first is its 
pension system. As a compulsory capitalization scheme for employees, the pension system 
makes the vast majority of workers shareholders of corporations. This is because the 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP), the entities that collect and invest mandatory 
pension contributions, allocate part of their portfolios to the domestic stock market.  
The second is the manner and extent of the rent extraction that took place in some of the 
abovementioned takeovers. The most notorious one was known as the Chispas case, a takeover 
by the Spanish corporation Endesa of the former Chilean corporation Enersis. The latter was an 
electricity holding company that had been privately developed on the basis of Chilectra, a former 
state electricity company. When Chilectra was privatized in 1987, a fairly large group of former 
managers and employees of the company received the full amount of their severance payments, 
among other benefits, in the form of company stock. This group, in turn, created a company 
called Chispas, which had enough stock to become the controlling shareholder of Chilectra. Led 
by a small team that owned just a tiny fraction of Chispas shareholdings, Chilectra initiated an 
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company, with assets that included electric companies in other countries in Latin America. This 
small team within Chispas, in turn formed by the former top managers of the former state 
company and closely linked to the authoritarian regime, positioned itself in the key decision- 
making positions of Enersis, gaining de facto control of the conglomerate.  
During the 1990s, the expansion of the conglomerate was so fast that eventually it 
became short of capital to continue growing. The small team decided then, in October 1997, 
without any notification to the boards and shareholders of the various companies of the holding, 
to sell it to Endesa España. The negotiations of the takeover were undertaken by the small 
team—on behalf of all the shareholders of Enersis—on extremely beneficial terms for 
themselves at the expense of the rest of the shareholders, using the “de facto control” they had 
acquired. As could be expected, the rest of the shareholders tried to reverse the operation both 
within the holding company and in the courts. However the legal framework for corporate 
governance that existed at the time was so weak that the shareholders failed in their attempts to 
obtain any compensation (although 10 years later the small team was fined with severe pecuniary 
sanctions by the courts). 
In 1998, the government submitted to Congress a draft law designed to regulate the 
takeovers, attempting to ensure that if the controlling shareholders would sell their shares to 
another investor, all other shareholders could benefit if they wished to sell their shares at the 
same price. The law was called the law of Initial Public Offerings (IPO law). 
The draft law prompted fierce resistance from the incumbents. The presidents of the 
Chilean Stock Exchange and the CPC, the strong organization that congregates Chilean 
businesses, expressed their opposition before Congress. They argued that when takeovers take 
place, controlling shareholders have the right to be compensated for the so called “control 
premium,” and the attempt to force that party to share the premium with the rest of the 
shareholders was inappropriate and would lead to more concentration of the corporate sector and, 
consequently, it would reduce the “float” (shares commonly traded) in the stock market, 
impairing its development. Not surprisingly, representatives of LyD presented exactly the same 
views. 
As those opposed to the law argued, the IPO law would not favor the interests of the 
incumbents and the so-called “control premium” would eventually be diluted. That may well 
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matter of fact, that has been the trend in the last ten years. But it is also true that if minority 
shareholders feel they are exposed to value expropriation, their appetite for buying/holding stock 
will decrease. That will produce a reduction in the stock’s value, which would increase the cost 
of raising capital in the market, which would raise the entry barriers in the corporate sector and 
reduce competition and the appetite for risk and productivity growth. This is a classic example of 
the dichotomy between pro-market and pro-business policies. 
The draft law did not prosper for the last two years of the Frei administration (1998-99), 
since the government and the opposition could not reach an agreement. With the arrival of 
President Lagos, a compromise was reached after intense negotiations. The controlling 
shareholders were given three years to transfer their control to an interested party without the 
obligation to do so through an IPO. Even after that period, bilateral agreements for transferring 
control were allowed, provided that the share price implicit in the agreement would not exceed 
the market price by more than 15 percent. One might wonder why such an agreement was 
possible, why the opposition acquiesced to the agreement, given the existing political economy. 
Two possible explanations are evident. First, the visibility of the potential value extraction did 
nothing but increase with time, given that a number of such operations continued to cause public 
disgust. But although the visibility of the problem was at times high, the complexity of the 
solution made it possible for the powerful vested interests and their political representatives to at 
least mitigate the price of blocking the solutions with little political cost. Secondly, the 
agreement softened the eventual losses that controlling shareholders would have suffered, giving 
them time either to close their companies or to sell them, collecting the “control premium” at a 
discount. Given the political economy of these largely opaque although important economic 
issues, as discussed throughout this paper, only a “second-best” solution was politically 
available. 
The IPO law made limited progress in other areas where potential value extraction was 
possible, such as transactions with related parties or disposal of what could be considered 
“essential assets.” In principle, the controlling shareholder—or more generally, managers who 
have decision-making powers within a corporation—could extract value from the rest of the 
shareholders by buying or selling goods or services from outside suppliers at above-market rates 
or prices. Of course, these suppliers share common interests with the controlling shareholder. 
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assets” of the corporation to related parties. In mature capital markets, this problem has been 
confronted through a number of board committees that carefully review the company’s 
operations and try to identify possible transactions with related parties at prices that differ from 
market values. But in those mature markets, the incentives for board members are aligned with 
the interests of all shareholders, since there may not be a controlling shareholder because the 
property is generally diluted. Thus, the committees are meant to control managers. In Chile, as in 
other emerging economies with income concentration, it is common to find extremely wealthy 
individuals who can, by themselves or through a small group of peers, control enough stock of a 
corporation to be able to appoint the majority of its board, and hence become the controlling 
shareholder. The power of this controlling shareholder is so strong that minority shareholders do 
not get to elect a board member or a sufficient number of members to guarantee the committees’ 
independence from the controlling shareholder. Hence the board and the committees are there to 
protect the interests of the controlling shareholder, not of the minority ones. 
The problems associated with transactions with related parties acquired public visibility 
in the late 1990s, when an international telecom holding company that was the controlling 
shareholder of a Chilean telecom corporation acquired an “essential asset”—the Internet service 
provider Terra—from the Chilean corporation at a price that was considered by many to be 
significantly below market value. The problem associated with transactions with related parties 
received further public attention during the early 2000s from a very different prospective. This 
time, members of the opposition parties denounced the practice of transactions with related 
parties in public enterprises, practices that were reducing their profitability and, therefore, were 
affecting the interests of taxpayers and/or of those that would benefit from public expenditure. 
After months of intense work between the government and the skilled Finance Commission of 
the Senate, another capital market draft law designed to improve corporate governance was 
presented to Congress. 
As could be expected, a compromise with the Senate Finance Commission was very 
difficult because opposition Senators tried to water down the regulations relative to the private 
sector, while members of the Concertación were cognizant that stringent requirements on the 
governance of public enterprises could become an issue for a number of Senators in their camp 
(given the power of public enterprises unions in the Concertación). However, the expertise of the 
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weak corporate governance legal framework on economic growth moved them to embrace and 
actively improve the draft law. 
After these improvements, the main elements of the draft law can be summarized as 
follows. To ensure the appropriate control of potential value extraction through transactions with 
related parties, the draft law proposed the appointment of at least two independent board 
members, who would hold the majority in the now mandatory audit committee. This committee 
would scrutinize the transactions of the corporation and try to assess whether those transactions 
with related parties were made at market prices. For private corporations, the draft law proposed 
increasing the number of board members, if needed, to ensure that two independent members are 
elected, unless the controlling shareholder owns an overriding majority of the company stock. 
For public entities that did public offerings, two independent (i.e., independent from 
government) board members would be appointed. (It should be noted that these public 
companies do not issue stock; their public offerings take the form of bond issues, but 
bondholders do not have voting rights.) To ensure independence, various formulae were 
discussed, with the common feature of involving directly or indirectly the Senate, where, as 
discussed in the early sections of this paper, the opposition normally controls one half of the 
voting power, due to the binominal electoral system. As we discuss below, the draft law also 
controlled another form of potential value extraction known as insider trading.  
Once again, however, organized groups with vested interests attended the Finance 
Commission hearings to express their opposition to the draft law. It is remarkable to see their 
arguments, given the fact that they supposedly represent views from opposite ends of the 
political spectrum. During the Senate Finance Commission hearings, the most relevant unions of 
the public entities (which had placed bonds in the markets) expressed their disagreement with the 
draft law claiming that it would impose excessive control on these entities. This is because in a 
public holding company, board members would oversee each entity of the holding and, thus, 
independent-minded members would have a crucial role in appointing independent board 
members of those entities. In the unions’ view, this dual role would be detrimental to the 
efficiency of the entities. Some expressed fear that this would be a first step towards full 
privatization. In the case of the private companies, representatives of business organizations 
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of the boards’ operations. 
Although the Senate Finance Commission unanimously supported the draft law, the full 
Senate rejected it in the last working day of parliament of the Lagos Administration. The draft 
law needed a high quorum to be approved for discussion; thus, despite receiving the support of 
the majority, as it did, the draft law failed to clear the first hurdle needed for Senate 
consideration. The Senators who voted against the draft law represented regions where the more 
powerful public entities were more prominent. Non-elected Senators from the Armed Forces also 
voted against the law (those non-elected senators no longer exist). By law, the Armed Forces 
receive 10 percent of the total sales—not profits—of CODELCO. Therefore, like the unions, the 
Armed Forces are interested in maximizing production and not profits (the latter being what 
affects the taxpayer).  
Since then, there have been some unsuccessful attempts to improve corporate 
governance. Regrettably, the public’s interest in this pending issue has faded. As can be easily 
seen, all of the elements that have been highlighted as severe shortcomings of the current state of 
the PMP were at work: some visibility of the problem but a cumbersome and opaque solution for 
the median voter, the policy solution affects directly the interests of the more powerful and 
ideological groups, and these vested interests groups can work their way out of trouble through 
their influence in the political parties, since the opacity of the solution renders the political costs 
negligible to the ones that oppose the solution. 
Last but not least, another issue that surfaces periodically as a concern for the adequate 
protection of minority shareholder rights is the use of insider trading. A number of substantial 
stock trading by insiders, before essential information of a company is released to the market, 
has caused public debate and prompted investigations and legal actions by regulators. 
To be sure, the law does specify, to a great extent, the agents within a corporation that do 
have access to inside information. The list of such agents has been enlarged recently by 
subsequent legislation. However, a quite peculiar situation remains. What is prohibited is to use 
that privileged information when trading, but the law does not assume that that information is 
used even when trading is done during the window in which some relevant information about a 
company is known by the insiders and the time it is released to the market. To sanction those 
practices, the regulator needs to prove that the insider agents actually did use that privileged 
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generally the agents with inside information are active in the market, buying and selling paper. 
The regulator needs to prove that transactions with inside information were different from the 
agent’s usual pattern of trading. At the same time, these agents are generally wealthy and 
powerful individuals that can hire expensive and astute lawyers who could develop a public 
opinion campaign where they portray themselves as victims of political persecution. 
Following practices in mature economies, the draft law sought to end this odd situation. 
A rule in force in the United States, known as the swing-out profit rule, states that, if during the 
abovementioned time window agents conduct transactions with inside information, and the 
transactions become profitable or avoid losses to these agents, the sums involved must be given 
back by such agents. This rule was included in the draft legislation we have been referring to, but 
opposition think tanks, and hence the legislators in that camp, rejected the idea arguing that these 
agents were “market makers” and, therefore that the rule would damage the fluency of the 
market. Confirming the model we have developed in this paper, the complexity of the solution 
meant, once again, that the powerful interests negatively affected could exert a sort of veto 
power without incurring political discredit. 
In sum, the corporate governance regulatory framework in Chile is still weak. Some 
improvements have been made, but others are still pending. Improvements have been possible 
when the issues have acquired high public visibility and an expeditious solution “easy to 
understand by the general public” has been proposed. In contrast, when the issues, even with 
some public awareness, are too complex to mobilize public opinion in pursuit of a solution, 
vested interests have prevented change. 
 
6.5 Mixed Success and Interdependence of Reforms: Specific Mining Tax and Institutional 
Arrangements for innovation  
 
Chile clearly lags behind on the “inspiration” side of the economic growth equation. Innovation 
and related activities appear to be among the most neglected areas.   By mid-2004, a legislative 
initiative was sent to Congress with two objectives, to tax the mining sector and to create an 
Innovation Fund. The main argument behind the project was that a non-renewable resource was 
not generating enough assets to compensate for its exploitation and concomitant depletion. At the 
same time, a new institution in charge of securing a proper use for new resources was also 
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institutional reform associated with the FIC is still under discussion in Congress.  
This case can thus be broken into two separate but related processes. First, a mining-
specific tax aimed at financing innovation. Second, a major institutional reform, tied to regional 
preferences in the allocation system behind the tax collection, which sought to establish a state—
rather than just a government—policy stressing the importance of innovation. Here, we analyze 
the innovation case in two separate blocks. In what follows, we first provide a historical 
overview. We then discuss what triggered the reform and the main political actors involved. 
Then we discuss the final outcome and describe the equilibrium reached. 
 
6.5.1 First Mixed Success Policy Reform: Specific Mining Tax 
 
Between 2000 and 2004, several events triggered a debate on excising a royalty on mining 
extraction. On the one hand, there was a widely shared view that several large MNCs mining 
firms were not paying income taxes. The companies avoided paying taxes by using a 
simultaneous application of an accelerated depreciation mechanism
7 and the interest discount 
that can be paid to their headquarters for debts incurred in the initial financing of their 
investment (Boeninger 2007: 185). On the other hand, several political actors argued that firms 
were not paying for rents that this scarce and non-renewable resource might generate (Ricardian 
rents). For historical and political reasons, this second argument was very popular with the 
public. 
Although the reform was sent in 2004, there were several previous initiatives aiming to 
tackle this extremely beneficial tax situation for mining firms. One could even claim that those 
initiatives were simply corollary efforts of the widely popular nationalization of the copper 
industry championed by the Frei (1964-1970) and Allende (1970-73) Administrations before the 
Pinochet dictatorship. Copper was popularly referred to as “the salary of Chile,” and its 
nationalization was unanimously approved in the 1960s. Thus, even though private mining firms 
entered Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship, the public generally perceived that copper—if not 
                                                           
7Most foreign investors use the Estatuto de Inversión Extranjera (FDI law, Decreto Ley 600 in place since 1974), an 
instrument that guarantees non-discriminatory treatment under a legal agreement between foreign firms and the 
state. Foreign investors have access to a uniform exchange rate, 100 percent of the firm’s property; they may 
instantly take their profits out of the country, and they may also choose among different tax regimes available. Any 
modification to the investment contract should have the agreements of all involved parties in order to protect 
investor interests. 
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the state. Some of the most publicly known initiatives to tax private mining activities during the 
1990s were championed by PDC Senator Jorge Lavandero, who publicly campaigned in favor of 
pressing large MNCs firms to pay their fair share. However Lavandero’s almost maverick cause 
never had the support of the Concertación governments until the issues related to tax loopholes 
used by some mining firms provoked public outcry. Probably, the best known case was the 
Disputada de las Condes mine transaction process. Its owner, Exxon, sold it to Anglo American 
at a high price that failed to reflect the losses claimed in their tax declarations. Moreover the 
transaction itself was done overseas without being subject to Chilean taxes.
  
At the same time, since 2003 there were negotiations between the Ministry of Finance 
and the private association of miners (Consejo Minero) to increase taxes in this particular sector. 
The idea was to force firms to voluntary decline the tax benefits included in the DL600 which 
rules foreign direct investment. Since the Council believed that a tax increase would never pass 
Congress, negotiations did not advance substantially.  
The idea to levy a mining royalty started to gain popularity in 2003 as it became clear that 
the government would need to raise additional taxes to finance a major health program named 
Plan Auge as well to finance an ambitious social program, known as Chile Solidario, focused on 
the lowest quintile of the population. As Boeninger (2007) suggests, the fiscal situation was a 
major issue that helped build support for a mining royalty. Boeninger mentions two additional 
tax issues. First, the adoption of free trade agreements with the United States and the European 
Union would result in less tax collection. Second, Plan Auge required additional funding that 
was originally intended to be raised from tax increases on people with private health insurance. 
As free trade agreements reduced revenues and Plan Auge increased spending—without 
providing additional revenues—a mining tax or royalty became increasingly popular.  
The Lagos administration first proposed raising the value added tax (IVA) from 18 
percent to 19 percent and to levy additional taxes on tobacco and diesel. Although those 
proposals were very unpopular, Concertación  legislators agreed to support them only if the 
government agreed to establish royalty on the mining sector. Boeninger (2008) explains that, 
pressed by the entire Concertación, the Ministry of Finance sent an ad valorem tax proposal 
together with the creation of an Innovation Fund (FIC) in mid-2004. 
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muster the needed 4/7 majority. A new version of the legislation was sent to Congress in 2005 
under the figure of a specific tax which did not affect income tax laws and for which only a 
simple majority was needed to pass it. Given public concern about the issue just before elections 
and also that government credibility could be in jeopardy in foreign agencies, a rapid agreement 
emerged. 
Main Players and Arguments: Both the Consejo Minero and the SONAMI (National 
Mining Society) rejected the idea of royalty on mining production. Together with Sofofa and 
CPC, Consejo Minero and SONAMI pressed opposition legislators to vote against the initiative. 
The main argument to attract support from other sectors was that mining would be the first sector 
to be taxed. In fact, a precedent would be set for other royalties or the like to be proposed for 
other sectors in the future. Since modifications to the FDI Law were needed as well, it was also 
argued that a royalty would send a bad signal to foreign investors.  
However, opposition parties did not agree on the non-renewable resource argument. 
Some opposition leaders believed that firms should pay a patent to local municipalities. A 
modification to the royalty proposal was introduced by the government, ensuring regional 
allocation of resources derived from the royalty. The law finally passed. But the government 
made several concessions. Among them, the tax would only apply to new investments, and they 
would have tax invariability for 15 years. Nonetheless, UDI legislators voted against the 
initiative, arguing a turning point on tax neutrality policies and deterioration of Chile’s 
international image.  
From the start, the initiative raised opposition. The main opponents were large mining 
firms grouped in Consejo Minero, the National Mining Society (SONAMI), whose members are 
mostly medium and small size firms, large business associations, like CPC and Sofofa, which 
claimed they opposed establishing a precedent. The think tank LyD also opposed the initiative on 
several grounds: 1) having a sector tax undermined the principle of tax neutrality; 2) setting this 
tax would induce a similar tax on other productive sectors; and 3) this initiative would impose a 
change in FDI contracts (under Decree Law 600), negatively affecting foreign investment. The 
royalty law failed when it only garnered 61 of the 69 votes needed in the Chamber of Deputies. 
After six months, the government sent a new draft law, this time with a specific tax to mining 
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require only a simple majority in Congress for approval.  
Final Outcome: By 2005, conditions had changed (Boeninger, 2007). First, the royalty 
issue became more visible as public opinion overwhelmingly supported it. Second, taxing mining 
activities could be an election issue in 2005. In addition, the government was interested in 
solving this issue as a major confrontation on taxing mining might effectively affect FDI 
decisions and economic development as a whole. 
A window of opportunity led Concertación and RN legislators to agree on a solution. The 
opposition conceded to set 5 percent specific tax on income while the government agreed to a 
few concessions. For income tax purposes, the new tax would be an expenditure needed to 
produce the rent. The tax would be applied to operational rents, meaning sales costs, cumulative 
losses, and accelerated depreciation mechanisms would be considered in its calculation. No 
variation in tax regimes were offered for new investors for 15 years. There would be no 
retroactivity in the application for current contracts, although firms could choose between 
adopting the new tax regime and waiting until December of 2007 with a reduced tax of 4 percent. 
It may be argued that at the time of discussion, the visibility of the debate was very high. 
Public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of a new tax on mining. The new tax also affected 
only a small but powerful group of firms, most of them foreign. Indeed, it was an operational 
rather than a political problem, since historic compromises through the FDI legal setup was in 
jeopardy. But once the royalty figure was changed to an ad valorem tax, there were no major 
ideological issues remaining at the time of voting. 
The approval of the royalty was the result of bilateral negotiations between the Ministry 
of Finance representing the government and opposition, supported by the mining companies and 
business associations. Both parties had political costs, given the electoral calendar and the time 
horizon. The government’s goal was to invite rather than force firms to switch to the new tax 
system. Meanwhile, the Alianza could not oppose a tax already in place in most mining countries 
that would provide resources for research and development and innovation. 
 
6.5.2 Second Mixed Success Policy Reform: The Innovation Council 
 
Once the specific mining tax started to operate, questions arose as to how those resources would 
be allocated. One of the arguments advanced to justify the approval of the new tax was that it 
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in place when allocating the resources, with mining areas benefiting more than other areas. 
  During 2005, when discussing the royalty, an indication to the law created an Innovation 
Fund (FIC) that would be funded with resources from the mining tax. In addition, the initiative 
also suggested the creation of a National Innovation Council that, among other things, would 
oversee the proper allocation of these resources. Since the Council would have an advisory role, 
it was also proposed that a more executive oriented government institution should be created to 
oversee the systemic consistency of the proposed instruments and programs. The initiative also 
included the creation of a Ministerial Committee for Innovation (CMI). 
Although articles related to the ad valorem tax were finally approved, those related to the 
creation of an Innovation National Council and to the Innovation Fund are still under debate. At 
least two issues related to these articles impede their approval. The first is the composition of the 
Council. Both sides agree that regional interests should be represented, although there is no clear 
view as to how this will be implemented. The other issue is that resources coming from the fund 
should be directly allocated at the regional level. Although there is an article suggesting that, 
there is no agreement about the percentage of the fund under this regime. 
The discussion is not between parties but among regions. It is not an ideological debate, 
but rather a geographical interest especially between mining regions and others. At the same 
time, since the Council is de facto in operation and the Fund is de facto created, there is no 
reason for the government to speed up the process. Although members of the Council are aware 
of its legal constitution, the idea is in jeopardy if not considered by the next administration. 
Main Players and Arguments: The initiative was proposed to Congress by the Ministry of 
Finance with support from the Ministry of Economics, since the latter should be the head of the 
CMI and therefore would be closely involved in the allocation and following of the FIC 
resources among different programs.  
Meanwhile, the National Council was created by a decree, mirroring what was already a 
legal initiative. At the same time, as part of the decree, the Council was asked to make 
suggestions on the use of the FIC resources already in place. In performing this duty, geographic 
considerations should be taken into account as if the law were already operating. That is, 35 
percent of the FIC resources should be decided at the local rather than the national level.  
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representing regional interests, push for a higher ratio of FIC resources to be locally assigned. On 
the other hand, they see the Council as an institutional competitor, since they were de facto 
deciding on how to allocate FIC resources. 
The Ministry of Finance, interested in the first part of the law, related to the financing, 
does not feel comfortable conceding special rights to local agencies in the allocation of public 
resources. Moreover, although the Council is a potential collaborator of Finance, since they are 
giving informed advice in FIC allocation, the creation of a State, rather than government 
institution, is not favored by Finance. Therefore, the best situation is having the council but with 
the alternative that a new government may change it if wanted with no major transaction costs. 
Current Situation: Today the initiative is still in Congress. For more than five years, it has 
been stuck at different levels of the congressional process. There are two elements that may 
explain this apparent win-win equilibrium. On the one hand, Finance does not like to release 
allocation power to local agencies, as it is not very confident about local capacity. On the other 
hand, the Council as an institution seems to be competing with legislators on their duties. So, 
none of the major players seems interested in discussing the initiative. The parliamentary side is 
composed of most of the legislators, since most of them have regional interests. 
Probably, the Council is the only agent interested in the legal initiative being delivered. 
Given that it has no permanent legal status and the documents explicitly mention that a 
permanent entity seeking a national strategy in innovation should be in place, non-government 
members are pushing Finance to accelerate the debate over this in Congress. 
Finally, the issue itself is not very visible to the public, since the problem is complicated 
and the solutions are far from clear. There is no clear answer to the institutional design challenge. 
Moreover, the Council has studied the subject and agreed that the institutional  setup in 
promoting innovation needs to be tailor-made, depending among other things on several country-
specific characteristics. Therefore, it seems that the current equilibrium is quite stable and could 
only be broken if at some point the Council were dismantled. This might occur when the issue 
emerges again in the public arena and all actors are forced to make their positions known.  
Final Outcome: In 2005, in order to finance its health reform (Plan Auge) and social plan 
(Chile Solidario) and given the reduction in revenues because of the implementation of free trade 
agreements, the government was searching for new sources of revenue. Concertación parties did 
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opportunity arose when the press reported that large multinational firms (MNCs) were evading 
taxes. This became clear when the agreed price of a mine transacted among two large foreign 
MNCs failed to reflect economic losses reported to the Chilean tax office by the seller during 
previous ten years.  
Early in 2004, the Ministry of Finance sent legislation forward to modify the income tax 
law. It consisted of adding an ad valorem tax to sales which only applied to mining firms. Under 
the argument that firms were exploiting a non-renewable resource and not paying for it through 
the proposal, the government claimed that resources obtained from the tax would finance 
renewable activities (knowledge-based ones). The initiative led by Finance and backed by the 
Concertación was strongly opposed by the Alianza, which was pressured by the large mining 
firm association for obvious reasons. Arguments from the opposition included the danger of 
setting up sector-specific tax regimes and unilateral modification of MNC contracts with the 
state. These were mainly suggested by LyD, the think tank that articulated the Alianza 
arguments. However due to the fact that mainly foreign firms would be affected by the initiative, 
and given the public concern about the issue, the opposition soon agreed, as long as the law did 
not apply to past foreign mining contracts.  
Although the government was interested in financing these programs, there was still the 
issue of supporting knowledge-based activities, as explicitly argued by Finance. The law 
included the creation of an Innovation Fund (FIC) that would be financed with a portion of the 
resources collected by the tax and managed by an ad hoc council. It also suggested that a portion 
of the FIC’s resources be distributed geographically in accordance with the amount contributed 
by each region. This part of the law did not pass. After five years it is still under discussion in 
Congress. 
Meanwhile, by decree (a non-legislative ruling), the government created the National 
Council of Innovation, mimicking the institutional proposition defined in the draft law. Since 
that time, the Council has been de facto allocating resources from the FIC, taking into account 
among other things the regional partition also included in the law. The government not only 
directly participates in the Council board, since five ministers have voting rights, but also 
designates the other seven board members from civil society.  
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part of the law. Although the existence of the Council may help in providing technical support 
and also controlling for the proper use of FIC resources in public agencies such as CORFO and 
CONICYT, pushing its legal constitution may expose Finance to a discussion of the allocation of 
FIC resources from regional congressmen, therefore losing control over its use. On the other 
hand, legislators see the Council as a competitor, given that is suggesting FIC allocations, 
including to regional programs. In this context, the only ones interested in passing the law are the 
non-government members of the Council. They see that the only way that programs and their 
related budgets can be sustained in the future is by the non-government Council, which can 
tackle the time inconsistency problems that governments and legislators face. Today, neither the 
Council nor the innovation issue is visible to the general public. This equilibrium is unlikely to 
change. However, the abolition of the Council may expose the situation especially if the 
incoming government is from the current opposition. Then, it will most likely continue operating 





In the last 20 years, Chile’s policymaking performance has been outstanding in Latin America, 
transforming the country into an upper-middle-income economy.  In the last few years, however, 
institutional problems have prevented the implementation of efficiency enhancing policy reforms 
much needed to maintain high productivity growth rates. This paper suggests that to regain high 
productivity growth rates, Chile needs to implement reforms to increase the transparency of its 
policymaking arenas and reduce spatial policy fragmentation, including the following: 
 
•  A far-reaching state reform geared to increase the efficiency of the state 
bureaucracy and its policy coordination. 
•  An electoral system reform that maintains the positive effects of the binominal 
system while increasing it competitiveness. 
•  Improvement of the legislation that regulates the internal workings of political 
parties, campaign finance, and political conflict of interests. 
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economic development literature in general.  They emphasize the importance of seemingly 
unrelated political and bureaucratic reforms for generating long-term sustainable growth. 
As this paper is being written, several major institutional reforms are under discussion in 
Congress, with strong possibilities for approval. If those reforms are implemented, Chile would 
become an interesting natural experiment to test the findings of this paper.  These reforms would 
increase the visibility of moves of key socioeconomic actors, therefore increasing the likelihood 
of Chile regaining high productivity and economic growth. 
The PMP in Chile functioned well because of the high level of aggregation and the long-
term horizons during the time the reforms were implemented did not affect strong and highly 
organized interests at the core of the two polarized extremes of the political spectrum. For 
different reasons, those polarized elites had evolved during the post-dictatorial period into 
accepting the principles of fiscal responsibility, rejecting populist economic policies, and 
embracing market-friendly economic policies (in part because the agrarian sector in Chile, unlike 
what happened in Brazil and Argentina, never lost its hegemonic power, and the labor movement 
focused on the public sector and non-tradable goods, not on import-substitution industries). A 
good check and balance system and the electoral system with its majoritarian incentives helped 
enforce political agreements to sustain fiscal responsibility and market-friendly policies. The 
electoral system and the opaqueness of the political and campaign finance legislation ended up 
protecting the political forces at both ends of the political spectrum, making it more difficult for 
real competition to emerge in the political arena. Pending reforms now would directly affect 
those status quo powers which, logically, block and oppose such reforms.  
Because political reforms have lagged behind, the challenge ahead is to deepen and 
expand democracy so that the interests of the unorganized majority can be effectively 
represented in the political arena. Political reforms must go in tandem with, if not ahead of, 
policy reforms.  
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